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The Year In Review
RANDALL ELLSWORTH, IAN MORRISON, JUDITH KEENE,
PAUL RAPSEY AND GWYNETH PEARCE*
RItSUMI
Cet article traite des domaines importants du droit qui sont au centre des
activit~s des avocats qui travaillent dans les cliniques juridiques de l'Ontario
: aide sociale, indemnisation des accidents du travail, assurance-ch6mage,
Rgime de pension du Canada, logement, droits de la personne et Charte
canadienne des droits et libertos. I1 met principalement l'accent sur l'aspect
lgislatif, les politiques et les nouveaux d6veloppements concernant les ques-
tions litigieuses reli6es ces domaines de m~me que les effets sur les personnes
qui b~n~ficient de ces diff~rents programmes. De plus, cet article 6tudie les
divers processus de r~forme de la loi qui sont en cours, notamment l'examen
f~d6ral de la s~curit6 sociale et 1'examen provincial de l'indemnisation des
accidents du travail et de leurs effets anticip~s dans la pratique du droit des
pauvres.
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A. INTRODUCTION
This is the fourth review of poverty law in Ontario which we have written for
the Journal of Law and Social Policy.1 This year's article will cover the same
substantive areas of law as last year's: social assistance, workers' compensation,
unemployment insurance, Canada Pensions, housing, human rights and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 Our focus will again be on the
legislative, policy and litigation developments in these areas and their impact
on the individuals who are the beneficiaries of these various programs.
As in years past, we have had to exercise some discretion to decide which issues
will receive attention in the article. This discretion has been exercised based both
upon the seeming importance of the issues for the practice of poverty law and the
interests and experiences of the authors. Issues which are omitted from discussion
in the article are simply victims of the limitations of time, space and the authors'
expertise. Omission of any given issue is no reflection upon its relative importance.
Each year we have attempted to place the article within a context, by focussing
on the nature of economic restructuring, the recession/depression and the
political and societal responses to which these events have given rise. However,
changes in caseloads or the unemployment rate or the Gross Domestic Product
do not seem to be as relevant to this context any more. This year's article is
unique, because in 1993-94 social policy has become the context. This is true
on the international, 3 national, 4 provincial 5 and local level. 6 Almost all of the
1. See R. Ellsworth and I. Morrison, "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review"
(1991), 7 J.L. & Social Pol'y 1 [hereinafter Review 1991], R. Ellsworth and I. Morri-
son, "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review" (1992), 8 J.L. & Social Pol'y I
[hereinafter Review 1992], and R. Ellsworth, I. Morrison, J. Keene & P. Rapsey "Pov-
erty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review" (1993), 9 J.L. & Social Pol'y 1 [hereinafter
Review 1993].
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Hereinafter the Charter.
3. See for example, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "The
OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies" (OECD, 1994) and Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, "New Orientations for Social Policy" Social
Policy Studies No. 12 (OECD, 1994).
4. See the discussion below on the federal review of social security under Social Assis-
tance.
5. An Ontario provincial election is expected in the spring of 1995. Both provincial oppo-
sition parties have already made public pronouncements on issues such as workers'
compensation and social assistance, and will probably make these election issues. They
will also have to take a position on the federal social security review as well. The gov-
erning New Democrats will have to run on their legislative record which, as will be dis-
cussed below, contains efforts in all these issues.
6. See for example Child Poverty Action Group, Family Service Association of Metropol-
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income maintenance programs we will discuss are under some type of review
or "reform". As well, most of the areas to be discussed were also the subject of
major legislative change.
Further, it is becoming more and more evident that changes to any individual
program can and do have implications for other programs. Unfortunately, this
fact is often not even recognized by the people responsible for implementing
the changes. The impact that these cross-program implications might have is
magnified by the fact that so many of the programs are under review, and that
these reviews seem to be proceeding independently. 7 Finally, the continued
convergence of fiscal and social policy means that those concerned about social
policy must strive to be equally conversant with financial and economic issues.
While our discussion of the various areas of poverty law practice will attempt
to illustrate the importance of each, we have also attempted to place that
discussion in this broader context.
B. DEVELOPMENTS IN INCOME MAINTENANCE LAW
1. Social Assistance
Growth in social assistance caseloads in Ontario moderated significantly over
the past year, showing by far the lowest increase since the start of the recession.
Some eligibility categories even declined, reflecting the start of a modest
economic recovery.8 However, this has not translated into good news for
recipients and advocates. The dominant themes of the year are still the contrac-
tion of eligibility and attacks on the poor. Over the past four years the rate at
which new issues and problems with social assistance have emerged has accel-
erated tremendously, as the government has twisted and turned in the ideological
breezes in its attempts to deal with the "welfare problem". The issues covered
in this section will, we hope, highlight the themes of restricted eligibility and
backlash, and indicate some major areas of concern for the future directions of
social assistance in Ontario.
itan, Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto "The Outsiders: A Report on the
Prospects for Young Families in Metro Toronto" (1994).
7. See for example R. Ellsworth "Social Policy Review: What's in it for Injured Work-
ers?", (May/June 1994) The LA. V.G.0 Reporting Service, Vol. 8:2 at 39.
8. According to Ministry of Community and Social Services [hereinafter MCSS or "Min-
istry"] statistics, the total social assistance caseload grew by only 1.7% between August
1993 and August 1994 (cf. 8.2% annual growth August 1993, and 20.6% August 1992).
The general welfare caseload declined, reflecting employment market improvements,
while there was a small increase in the Family Benefits caseload.
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(a) Major Legislative and Policy Developments
Previous articles in this series have commented on the backlash against the poor
and the welfare system, which grew as the recession deepened. Most significant
this year is how the government chose to situate itself in relation to the backlash.
By the start of the period under review, economic and political pressures had
already stalled the NDP's initial agenda for reform. By the end of the period the
government had moved even further to identifying with and even reinforcing
the "welfare fraud" hysteria which represents the most overt component of the
new anti-welfare sentiment.
(i) Social Assistance law reform
A decade of movement towards a comprehensive overhaul of Ontario's social
assistance came to an end this year. At this time last year, Ontario had finally
released its official position on social assistance reform, Turning Point, touted
widely as a plan to "end welfare as we know it". 9 It contained three main
components: the Ontario Child Income Program (OCIP), a universal benefit to
all poor children delivered through the tax system; an Ontario Adult Benefit
(OAB), intended to consolidate and replace the complex and outdated two-tier
system of municipal welfare and provincial family benefits with a single piece
of legislation with simplified eligibility requirements; and JobLink, intended to
provide social assistance recipients with guaranteed educational and job cre-
ation placements.
By the summer of 1994, almost all of the Turning Point program had been
quietly abandoned. First to go was OCIP, dropped in the early spring of 1994
when it became clear that necessary federal funding would not be forthcoming.
The proposed new adult benefit legislation was quietly dropped a few months
later, by April 1994. A version of JobLink was in fact announced in June 1994,
but bore little resemblance to the ambitious initial proposal. The original
announcement of 100,000 targeted placements in educational and training
programs had shrunk to 4000, while the government's total initial contribution
was a mere $25 million.
10
At the time of writing Joblink is still under development, and the federal
government has announced a matching financial contribution to the program. It
appears that some of the JobLink initiatives may be of some interest and value
to recipients, especially as current versions of the program appear to have taken
9. Ontario, Turning Point: New Support Programs For People with Low Incomes
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, July 1993). See Review 1993 at 18-21 for further discussion
of the Turning Point proposals.
10. MCSS News Release (21 June 1994), "Silipo Announces JobLink Ontario to Help
Move People Off Welfare".
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into account community criticisms of earlier proposals. I In the end, however,
JobLink remains a very small drop in a very large bucket of needs.
Abandonment of comprehensive welfare reform got a mixed reaction from
activists and advocates. People who had worked for progressive reform were
obviously disappointed, after years of increasing hopes, but in the end many of
those most closely involved with the reform process were relieved that the
project was abandoned, as they watched the steady drift to the political right,
and the emergence of the Expenditure Control Plan and Enhanced Verification
as the main issues for social assistance recipients in Ontario.
(ii) Expenditure Control and Enhanced Verification
The spate of rollbacks and eligibility restrictions begun in 1993-93 continued
throughout 1993-94 as MCSS combed programs for savings. However, by
spring of 1994, more than just incremental cuts were on the table. News was
leaked in early March that the Cabinet was considering broad across-the-board
social assistance rate cuts. 12 It was widely rumoured that Premier Bob Rae and
Finance Minister Floyd Laughren, both of whom have showed increasing public
and private hostility towards social assistance during the government's mandate,
were in favour of cuts.
The rate cut proposal was eventually dropped, 13 but we may never know for
certain to what extent defeat of that proposal and subsequent events are con-
nected. Shortly after that decision, government rhetoric about social assistance
became much more aggressive. On March 28 Social Services Minister Tony
Silipo publicly announced that "Ontario is stepping up its fight against welfare
fraud", promising to "pursue...abusers of the system more vigorously".14 The
new anti-fraud campaign centred around a policy initiative called "Enhanced
Verification and Casefile Investigation", the main components of which were
more frequent and intensive investigation of social assistance recipients, increased
formal information demands from recipients (particularly for documentary evi-
dence of eligibility) related to the new and more restrictive eligibility rules intro-
11. JobLink has evolved through consultation with consumers and community groups to
place greater emphasis on community economic development (CED) and self-employ-
ment. The original JobLink proposal ignored both CED and self-employment, which
caused the proposal to be heavily criticized by consumers.
12. W. Walker, "NDP puts welfare cuts on the table: Explosive issue to be taken to caucus
amid deficit woes" The Toronto Star (21 March 1994) A].
13. Defeat of the rate cut proposal was due at least in part to an intense last-minute cam-
paign against cuts by recipients, advocates, social agencies and faith groups.
14. MCSS News Release (28 March 1994).
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duced over the past two years, and increased pressure on recipients to pursue
other potential sources of income.
"Enhanced Verification" itself already existed in March 1994. Work on intensi-
fying eligibility verifications began as a result of the 1992 Report of the
Provincial Auditor, which was very critical of MCSS. 15 The first Enhanced
Verification policy directive was distributed to MCSS offices in November
1993. What was new in the March 28 announcement was the explicit situating
of Enhanced Verification as the centrepiece of an "anti-fraud" campaign and a
crucially important shift in emphasis from the (alleged) inadequacies in Ministry
verification practices to recipients as the "problem". The March 28 announce-
ment included the existing initiative but extended it to municipalities, along with
promising 270 new FB caseworkers and substantial new funding for municipal-
ities to conduct their own casefile investigations.
Final versions of the Enhanced Verification policy manuals have only been in
field offices for a few months. Nevertheless, experience with the initiative is
rapidly accumulating. Three main points can be made here. First, the new
documentation demands, many of which are irrelevant or unnecessary, and more
demands for "enhanced verification' interviews have increased the general sense
of harassment felt by recipients. Second, greater scrutiny, more rules and
substantially increased resources for "investigation" have meant an explosion
in the level of abusive treatment suffered by clients. Such treatment has ranged
from completely arbitrary information demands1 6 to far more abusive and
threatening treatment from the growing number of "welfare cops". Finally,
intensified scrutiny of clients has resulted in a wide array of threats to the rights
of privacy and confidentiality which have taken years to achieve.
Aspects of these points will be discussed in more detail below. The point to be
made here is that in many places Enhanced Verification is coming to dominate
the experiences of recipients and their advocates. There does not appear to be
any likelihood that this will change in the near future. At the time of writing the
rhetoric around welfare fraud is again heating up, again deliberately instigated
by Social Services Minister Tony Silipo, and probably presaging a new round
of "crackdowns". 17 The 1994 Auditor's Report is expected to be released in the
fall and is likely to again be critical of the Ministry.
15. See Review 1993 at 8.
16. For example, one clinic reports that a client was ordered to obtain a "legal" separation
agreement with respect to a man to whom she had never been married and with whom
she had not lived for several years. There was, of course, no legal justification for the
demand.
17. W. Walker, "Major welfare foulups revealed: Fraud, error found in 20% of Ontario
(1994) 10 Journal of Law and Social Policy
(b) Litigation Developments And Current Issues
The list of significant issues from 1993-1994 is long indeed. The order of
presentation is somewhat arbitrary, but starts with issues of general impact for
all recipients and moves towards issues for particular categories or communities
of recipients.
One general comment is perhaps in order before reviewing such a wide range
of issues and legal responses. An analysis of legal developments illustrates the
limits of litigation as a strategy, in and of itself, in the face of determined
government opposition. Increasingly, the response to successful litigation has
been simply to change the law. Several legal victories at the tribunal and judicial
levels have been reversed by quick regulatory action 18 and in one case the
Ministry changed the law before a decision was even rendered! 19 Clearly, the
longstanding debate over how legal and non-legal strategies can be utilized
together to achieve genuine results is taking on a new urgency.
(i) Procedural justice and the Social Assistance Review Board
We have reported before on the strains on the Social Assistance Review Board
(SARB) caused by increased caseloads. 20 The situation has continued to dete-
riorate. SARB now anticipates approximately 20,000 requests for hearing in the
1994/95 fiscal year, an increase of about 60% over 1993/94, which in turn was
an increase of about 80% over the previous year.2 1 Significantly, this increase
cases" The Toronto Star (22 September 1994) Al, A28. The story reported on state-
ments made by Silipo to the press purporting to justify the Enhanced Verification initia-
tive. The Progressive Conservative finance critic (unconstrained, as usual, by facts)
made the scurrilous allegation that fraud could be responsible for up to $1 billion in
losses out of social assistance spending of around $6 B (Walker, Ibid. A28). Initial
reporting of the issue in most media was sensationalist, although some later and more
careful accounts acknowledged that the announcement in fact showed nothing of the
sort: e.g., J. Laucius, "Welfare official disputes 20% overpayment figure" Ottawa Citi-
zen (24 September 1994).
18. For example: the decision in Rubino v. Metropolitan Toronto (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 289
(Div.Ct.) that money borrowed by a welfare recipient was not income was reversed
(O.Reg.788/93;789/93); regulations were amended to prevent the Social Assistance
Review Board from exercising discretion to relieve recipients from repayment of large
overpayments which had been incurred upon receipt of lump sum retroactive benefits
from other programs (O.Reg.788/93; 789/93); regulations were amended to reverse
SARB decisions which had held that individuals living apart from their spouses could
get FB sole support parent benefits where there was no "marital breakdown"
(O.Reg.436/93).
19. See the discussion below under Social Assistance and Immigration, note 65.
20. Review 1993 at 12.
21. Estimates provided to Ian Morrison by SARB. By way of comparison, in 1989/90
SARB received 3,866 requests for hearing.
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comes at a time when the caseload growth has virtually levelled off.22 The
increased demand would seem to be mostly attributable to eligibility restrictions
and Enhanced Verification. It is not surprising therefore that SARB's struggle
to control its backlog has been only partly successful. SARB has instituted a
number of internal streamlining initiatives, including issuing shorter decisions
and orders, deliberately overbooking some appeals and sitting as one member
panels only except in unusual cases. However, while these have helped some-
what, they are insufficient to meet the full extent of the problem.
The backlog means that the average time taken by the Board to render a decision
in a case is far too long for an appeals tribunal dealing with entitlements to basic
necessities. The only reason the appeals system has avoided full fledged crisis
is because of SARB's authority to order interim assistance pending decision. In
turn, however, the interim assistance program has come under attack, diverting
attention away from the structural issues facing the Board. Interim assistance is
hotly resented by many delivery agents. Accusations of "abuse" of interim
assistance grew louder this year, and hostility towards interim was reflected in
public attacks on SARB through the media, by opposition politicians in the
Legislature, and in the ongoing problem of refusals to pay interim assistance
ordered by SARB. The latter issue almost went to court this year on an
application for mandamus to compel payment of an order, but the matter was
settled on the day of hearing, with the municipality agreeing that it was obliged
to honour an order for interim assistance.
23
The Ministry claims that it is committed to improving the appeals process.
At the time of writing the Ministry has amended the regulations governing
SARB membership to allow for up to nine additional members. 24 It remains
to be seen whether the Ministry initiatives will be successful or whether the
backlog will have reached a point of no return before adequate resources are
made available.
(ii) Social Assistance and the Charter
An important Charter development this year (although not directly applicable
to Ontario law) was a challenge to the infamous "man-in-the-house" rule, which
22. Supra, note 8. Estimates provided to Ian Morrison by SARB.
23. Cole v. Administrator, City of Barrie (Ont.Div.Ct. No. G10024 (Barrie). The applicant
was represented by Simcoe Legal Services Clinic. The municipality had counterclaimed
that SARB could not order interim assistance without affording the municipality a full
hearing. While the counterclaim was spurious, it is indicative of the hostility towards
SARB and interim assistance of many delivery agents.
24. O.Reg. 554/94 made under the Ministry of Community and Social Services Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. M-20.
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arose in a Nova Scotia case. R. v. Rehberg25 involved a fraud prosecution of a
sole support parent for living with an undisclosed "spouse". The accused
successfully argued that the Nova Scotia "man-in-the-house" rule violated s. 15
of the Charter. The Court accepted that the "man-in-the-house" rule was based
on an oppressive stereotyping of women and therefore violated the equality
guarantee contained in s. 15.26
Two other cases challenged age-based eligibility rules in welfare programs, with
conflicting results.27 After years of procedural wrangling, SARB finally
released its first major Charter decision, dismissing an argument that the
categorical exclusion of people under the age of 16 from general welfare
assistance in Ontario violated the Charter.28 The Board accepted that the rule
imposed an age-based discrimination contrary to s.15(1) but held that it was
saved by s. 1 of the Charter. The decision is currently under appeal to the Ontario
Divisional Court.
29
A Manitoba Court, on the other hand, struck down a policy of the City of
Winnipeg which discriminated on the basis of age. The applicant was a 17-year-
old woman who lived in a common-law relationship and had a child. She was
refused assistance on the basis of a blanket policy which required any person
under 18 to show that she was unable to return to her parental home. The Court
had little difficulty concluding that the rule was discriminatory and that it was
not saved by s. 1.
30
25. (1993), 127 N.S.R.(2d) 331 (N.S.S.C.T.D.). On October 17, 1994 the Attorney General
of Nova Scotia abandoned an appeal in this case.
26. This argument was first theorized by feminist legal scholars years earlier. A case using
this argument was started in 1985 in Ontario with the support of the Womens' Legal
Education and Action Fund (LEAF). The Ontario definition of spouse at that time was
similar to that considered in Rehberg. It was eventually settled when the government
undertook to amend the definition of "spouse" to bring it in line with the definitions
used in Ontario family law legislation.
27. This discussion is restricted to cases argued and decided on the merits. A number of
challenges to a rule denying welfare to people between 18 and 21 living at home have
been allowed by SARB based on concessions by MCSS counsel that the application of
the rule in those cases violated the Charter, see Review 1993 at 10.
28. SARB G-12-08-21.2 (August 23, 1993; McCormick). For previous developments in this
case, see Review 1993 at 10.
29. Mohamed v. Metropolitan Toronto (Ont.Div.Ct. No. 609/93). The appellant is repre-
sented by Justice for Children and Youth, Toronto.
30. Clemons v. City of Winnipeg (April 28) Suit No. CI-94-01-78835 (Man.Q.B.) [unre-
ported].
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Finally, some important Charter issues may be decided in the next year. One
Ontario case scheduled for hearing in early 1995 raises the question of whether
s.15 of the Charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of "poverty" or the
receipt of social assistance. 3 1 At issue is whether the practice of utilities
companies of demanding security deposits, which many social assistance recip-
ients seeking accommodation cannot pay, violates the Charter. Also at issue is
whether the Ontario Human Rights Code32 violates the Charter by failing to
prohibit discrimination against social assistance recipients in the provision of
public services.
33
(iii) Privacy rights of welfare recipients
Protection of privacy has been an issue of growing importance for advocates
for some time, as recipients' rights to privacy have come under steady attack.
Several important issues relating to the right to privacy arose this year.
In November 1993 the Lambton County Council passed a resolution authorizing
the County Warden to obtain and review a list of the names of all welfare
recipients in the County.34 This occasioned an acrimonious stand-off between
the municipality and the province, with the local legal clinic threatening litiga-
tion if the matter was not resolved. The matter was not in fact finally resolved
until the province cut welfare transfer payments to the municipality, forcing the
municipality to rescind its resolution.
35
Meanwhile, it was revealed in February 1994 that the Municipality of Metro-
politan Toronto, the largest welfare delivery agent in Ontario, was exploring the
possibility of fingerprinting all welfare recipients. 36 Nothing came of the idea
at the time, but fingerprinting is used in a number of American jurisdictions and
the issue may only be in temporary abeyance.
31. Clarke et al v. Peterborough Utilities Commission et al (Ont.Ct.(Gen.Div.)) Nos.
6605/91, 6900/91,7045/91. The National Anti-poverty Organization, the Centre for
Equality Rights in Accommodation and the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty have all
intervened.
32. R.S.O. 1990cH-19.
33. The Code currently prohibits discrimination on grounds of social assistance in respect
of accommodation, but does not extend this protection to other services.
34. In 1990 another municipal Council attempted to obtain the names of welfare recipients
to police the welfare rolls. The Council's resolution was ultimately quashed in court:
H.(J.) v. Hastings (County) (1992), 8 Admin.L.R.(2d) 157; see Review 1992 at 16.
35. It appears that the resolution was never acted on once it became a contested issue, and
that the refusal to rescind the resolution ultimately became a test of local autonomy.
36. "Fingerprint plan for welfare urged" The Globe and Mail (16 February 1994) A l.
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Finally, issues of privacy and social assistance were addressed in hearings by
the Standing Committee on the Legislative Assembly into the Municipal Free-
dom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.3 7 The ideological gulf in the
battle over privacy rights was made clear during these hearings. On one hand,
clinics appeared before the Committee to plead for increased legislative protec-
tion of welfare recipients' privacy; 38 on the other, the Committee heard a
controversial municipal politician attack the basic premises of the Act with the
increasingly common argument-and one which undoubtedly reflects the views
of a significant number of provincial and municipal Ontario politicians-that
receipt of social assistance itself entails a forfeiture of civil rights. 39
Whatever the Standing Committee eventually recommends, the reality is that
violations of recipients' privacy rights are commonplace. 40 Moreover, despite
rhetorical support of privacy rights, MCSS continues to erode those rights that
do exist. The Ministry's most recent action in this respect was to replace an
already broadly worded mandatory "consent to disclose" form, which recipients
must sign as a condition of getting assistance, 4 1 with an even more sweeping
one, which for all practical purposes authorizes uncontrolled release of infor-
37. R.S.O. 1990 c. M-56 [hereinafter MFIPPA]. The review is pursuant to the Act itself
(s.55), which required the Standing Committee to undertake a comprehensive review
and report to the Legislature.
38. Briefs were presented by the Ontario legal clinics' Steering Committee on Social Assis-
tance, Community Legal Assistance Sarnia (whose geographical catchment area
included Lambton County), and the Renfrew County Legal Clinic (serving a number of
unconsolidated rural municipalities).
39. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the Legislative Assembly, Offi-
cial Report of Debates (Hansard) (19 January 1994), presentation of E. Dodds (Thun-
der Bay City Council). The essence of Ms Dodds presentation can be taken from the
following passage (at M-204): "[T]he time has come that the right of the public to pro-
tect its money must outweigh the right of the individual to privacy when public funds
are accessed... For thousands of years [sic] it has been known that the greater the depen-
dence of the citizenry on its government for support, the more liberty has to be given
up. It's simply a fact. If you depend on the government to support you, you give up
your right to privacy because the taxpayers' right not to have their money abused is
greater." Ms Dodds also presented a lengthy brief arguing that MFIPPA prevented
effective fraud detection and prevention.
40. Several examples are provided in the clinic briefs to the Standing Committee, supra,
note 38. The point has often been made that privacy protection is such a low priority
that many routine business practices of delivery agents potentially reveal the identities
of social assistance recipients.
41. General Welfare Assistance Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 537 (GWA) Form 3. An
application for assistance must be accompanied by a completed Form 3: Reg.537,
s.9(3). The same form is prescribed for Family Benefits applications.
Poverty Law in Ontario
mation to any party.42 The new form has caused alarm amongst many recipi-
ents 43 and at the time of writing a legal challenge seems probable.
(iv) Welfare fraud and the criminal process
Another consequence of Enhanced Verification and the general welfare backlash
has been a dramatic increase in the number of welfare fraud prosecutions,
4 4
contributing further to the prevailing atmosphere of anxiety and insecurity.
People faced with a threat of prosecution have good reason to be afraid, even if
innocent. Usually their benefits will have been terminated, adding to the stress,
especially for those with children. 45 They confront a criminal defence bar mostly
unfamiliar with the complexities of social assistance legislation and who may
not be aware of available defences. In many cases they will have signed
documents "admitting" fraud, having been told by an investigator that they have
no choice.46 Most advocates are aware of people who plead guilty to charges of
welfare fraud simply to "get it over with". 47 There will undoubtedly be more
such cases in the future.
Of particular concern is a recent decision undermining years of struggle for
better legal protection of women. The definition of "spouse" contained in
Ontario social assistance regulations provides in part that "in determining
42. O.Reg.318/94.
43. For example, one recipient wrote in a letter to her MPP (a Cabinet Minister) [copied to
Ian Morrison]: "I would starve before I would allow anyone to rampage through my
personal life in this manner... Why is it that only subsistence level poor are subject to
this type of degrading, humiliating and integrity destroying social torture?"
44. While we do not have precise statistics for this phenomenon, advocates in clinics across
the province report unprecedented increases in the number of fraud charges. This has
also been evidenced by the substantial increase in the number of requests for adjourn-
ments before the Social Assistance Review Board by people awaiting criminal trial,
such that the Board has actually distributed a formal practice direction with respect to
this situation (Practice Directions: "Adjournments where appellants are facing criminal
charges" 17 October 1994)
45. Although comprehensive statistics are not available, it appears that women are dis-
proportionately charged with fraud: see D. Martin, "Passing the buck: Prosecution of
welfare fraud; Preservation of stereotypes" (1992), 12 Windsor Yearbook of Access to
Justice 52. It is also striking how many clinic staff, from different clinics and dealing
with different offices, report that Eligibility Review Officers display misogynistic
behaviour and selectively (or exclusively) pursue investigations of female recipients.
46. Instances of people being told to sign documents or have their benefits terminated
immediately are routinely reported by social assistance advocates. At the time of writ-
ing a formal complaint has been made to the Ministry by Hastings & Prince Edward
Legal Services with respect to several incidents of this nature documented by the clinic.
47. See also D. Martin, supra, note 45.
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whether or not a person is a spouse.. .sexual factors shall not be investigated or
considered". 48 In R. v. Jantunen,49 Kurisko J. of the Ontario Court (General
Division) held that this section had no application to a fraud prosecution based
on alleged unreported cohabitation. Kurisko J. summarily dismissed the sugges-
tion that criminal liability should be based on the same test of cohabitation used
to determine eligibility, castigating the section as creating a "distorted and
unrealistic" test which "has shackled the Director with an artificial and unreal-
istic approach to the meaning of cohabitation that is inconsistent with the
common law". 5 0 Evidence of sexual activity was admitted and the accused
convicted.
Jantunen should sound alarms for feminists and social assistance activists for
many reasons-not least of which is an express distinction drawn in the decision
between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" sex by poor women. 51 More generally,
the language in the case is consistent with a growing hostility towards the
relatively privileged position of sole support parents in the complex hierarchy
of social assistance "deservedness".
52
(v) Financial Eligibility
As we have noted before, many technical issues concerning financial eligi-
bility have very important consequences for social assistance recipients.
Because it is generally difficult or impossible to develop any kind of political
campaign around these kinds of issues, the legal role is particularly important
in this area.
One problem in this area is whether payments from other sources should be
treated in their net or gross amounts as income for social assistance purposes.
The issue arises with respect to a wide range of deductions, including income
tax withheld at source, support payment and other garnishment deductions from
employment and social insurance payments. In 1993 the Divisional Court
rendered an unfavourable decision in the Wedekind 53 case, holding that the UI
payments should be deducted from income in their gross amount, disregarding
48. Family Benefits Regulations, R.R.O. 1990 Reg. 366, s. 1(2).
49. April 18, 1994; Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported]; currently under appeal.
50. Ibid. at 8. Although the language in the decision is tempered somewhat, press reports
suggested that during the hearing the judge was openly hostile to the whole definition
of "spouse" describing it as a "loophole large enough to drive a truck through".
51. Ibid.
52. See further the discussion of Sole Support Parents, below.
53. (1993), 62 O.A.C. 70 (Div.Ct.). For a discussion of this case see Review 1993 at 15-16.
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income tax deductions. A decision from the Ontario Court of Appeal on this
issue is expected this year.
54
Another problem area in the definition of income is the treatment of "no fault"
automobile insurance payments. Social assistance regulations exempt from
income monies paid as compensation for pain and suffering, up to a limit
$25,000. Prior to the introduction of no-fault insurance, this usually meant that
accident victims received some compensation which was not "taxed back".
However, SARB has generally refused to characterize no-fault awards as com-
pensating for pain and suffering; in January of 1994 this position was affirmed
by the Ontario Divisional Court.
5 5
(vi) Teens and welfare
One of the most politically contentious issues in social assistance is the eligi-
bility for benefits of teens and young adults, especially 16 and 17-year-olds.
They are only eligible for assistance as single adults if they can show "special
circumstances" (usually physical, sexual or psychological abuse or severe
family breakdown). 56 The past year saw a stream of attacks on teen welfare,
both in the press and in the Legislature. 57 The attacks also targetted legal clinics
and SARB, who are inevitably accused of contributing to the "abuse" of the
system by assisting teens refused by local welfare departments. 5 8
The importance of this issue lies in its ideological significance. While media
construction of the issues paints a picture of rampant abuse, the actual numbers
involved are trivial-in fact, from everything that is known about the extent of
54. Wedekind is scheduled to be heard in the Court of Appeal November 14, 1994.
55. Gates v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services) (1994) 19 O.R.(3d) 158.
An application for leave to appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal has been filed. The
appellant is represented by the Kingston Community Legal Clinic.
56. General Welfare Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 537, s.7(b). The regulation refers only
to "special circumstances"; the restriction of this category to cases of abuse and severe
family breakdown is by policy only.
57. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard) (28 March 1994)
5188; (28 March 1994) 5189; (29 March 1994) 5231; (12 April 1994) 5533; (18 April
1994) 5670. While few would be naive enough to expect cool objectivity during Ques-
tion Period, it is nevertheless striking the degree to which both the law and the statistics
were misstated in these exchanges.
58. For example see "A study in frustration: Clogged appeals system lets welfare applicants
collect now, explain later" The Sault Star (14 June 1994). This article, which attacked
both SARB and the local legal clinic for providing interim assistance, was part of a
week long series in the same paper attacking the availability of teen welfare. Accusa-
tions that the appeals system was a dupe in the manipulations of the system by teens
were also part of the series of exchanges in the Legislative Assembly, ibid.
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physical, sexual and emotional abuse within families, the number of teens who
apply for welfare to escape impossible family situations is clearly only a tiny
fraction of those potentially eligible.59 However, constructing a "crisis" of
welfare abuse around teens incorporates some of the most important themes of
the welfare backlash: it targets a relatively powerless and unorganized group
with little effective ability to respond, the issue is framed as a defence of the
"family" (i.e., the power relations and inequalities within the nuclear family),
and it both implicates and contributes to the perception that the abuse of welfare
programs is widespread. These themes are also crucial strategies in the campaign
to contract income maintenance programs and to make them more coercive and
punitive.
60
(vii) Social Assistance and Immigration
Immigrants and refugees have been special targets for fiscal restraint. When last
year's article was written, Ontario had just acted to disentitle failed refugee
claimants and certain other non-residents from benefits, and to slash entitle-
ments to sponsored immigrants. 6 1 This measure was met with outrage by
immigrant communities and social assistance activists. Unprepared for the
vehemence of the community response, the government again amended the
regulations in December 1993.62 However, while the December amendments
removed most problems with respect to refugee claimants, the sponsored
immigrant rules remain highly contentious. 63
Only some of the legal issues from the December amendments have been
litigated to date.64 Some issues relate to the statutory exemptions to the new
59. For example, in July 1994 there were 346,500 GWA cases in Ontario, representing
610,000 beneficiaries. Of these less than 8000 were 16 & 17 year old "special circum-
stances" cases.
60. Space precludes a fuller examination of these issues in this article, but the issue of teen
welfare usually includes alternative proposals with significant coercive and/or punitive
elements.
61. See Review 1993 at 16-17.
62. O.Reg.788/93; O.Reg.789/93.
63. The August amendments reduced eligibility to a nominal $50.00 per month by deeming
recipients to be in receipt of income from the sponsor up to this amount, but allowed
recipients to show that their sponsors were unable to provide support. The December
amendments abolished this presumption, but enacted a mandatory $100.00 deduction
for recipients living apart from sponsors (more for those living with sponsors), regard-
less of the sponsor's ability to pay. The regulations recognize exemptions where the
sponsor is also on assistance or where the sponsorship breakdown involved "family
violence".
64. The sponsored immigrant changes are a major contributor to the strain on the appeals
system. A substantial proportion of the appeals in the past year have involved spon-
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deeming rules. Because the scope of the exemptions is not clear and their
application requires detailed indivualized case examination, much room is left
for dispute and therefore litigation. Moreover, careless drafting (nothing new in
social assistance law) has resulted in the need for clarifying amendments.
6 5
The greater issue, however, is whether the province will succeed in imposing
what amounts to a new "poll tax" on poor immigrants. 66 A group of clinic
lawyers in conjunction with community agencies has indicated an intention to
challenge the constitutional validity of the new rules. The issue has become even
more important as governments increasingly target refugees and immigrants for
cuts to social benefit programs. 6 7 Litigation on a variety of related topics in the
upcoming year seems likely.
(viii) Disability Issues
As predicted last year, a province-wide "blitz" to force disabled social assistance
recipients to apply for Canada Pension Plan (CPP) disability benefits has caused
a host of problems for recipients. 68 Many of these stem from the fact that social
assistance delivery agents seem to know little about either the eligibility rules for
CPP disability benefits, or the process of applying for benefits. Advocates report
that many people who are clearly ineligible for CPP have been forced to apply,
some recipients have been told (illegally) that their applications for Family Benefits
will not be processed until they have completed an application for CPP, and
longstanding problems of obtaining medical reports from uncooperative doctors
have been exacerbated. Applicants and recipients with psychiatric disabilities, who
are often especially vulnerable to inappropriate treatment, have been particularly
affected.
sored immigrant reductions.
65. One of the largest classes of sponsored immigrants are "parents". By incorporating
"immigration" definitions which had not been used in immigration legislation for
decades, the original amendments inadvertently excluded this class. This interpretation
was confirmed in SARB M-07-15-02/M-11-21-06 (September 12, 1994; Bradbury,
Renault), a case argued jointly by Scarborough Community Legal Services and Metro
Toronto Chinese and Southeast Asian Clinic. In a break from its usual practice of
reversing adverse decisions, the Ministry amended the regulations to preclude this argu-
ment before a decision was even rendered; see O.Reg.419/94;420/94.
66. Thanks to John McKean, Bloor Information and Legal Services, for this pithy charac-
terization of the $100 deduction.
67. For example, immigrants and refugees have also been targetted for medical insurance
cuts.
68. See Review 1993 at 17-18.
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Further problems from Enhanced Verification are expected. The program antic-
ipates that the eligibility of all people receiving benefits as disabled or perma-
nently unemployable persons under the FBA will be reviewed. 69 Furthermore,
all recipients found to be permanently unemployable as a result of an appeal to
SARB 70 are to have their eligibility reviewed after two years, necessitating a
further round of doctors' visits and expensive medical reports, regardless of the
Board's specific findings on the nature and duration of the conditions. This will,
of course, further strain the capacity of legal clinics to provide services.
(ix) Sole support parents
Finally, we must mention the specific consequences of Enhanced Verification
for women and particularly sole support parents. In many respects it has and
will be felt most severely by women.
There are several reasons for this. Some Enhanced Verification items primarily
affect women, such as a proposal by which all parents of school-aged children
would be required to provide MCSS a form signed by the school to "prove" their
children's attendance. After vehement opposition by recipients (supported by
the more progressive of teachers' associations) this particular proposal was
substantially modified. 7 1 Enhanced Verification also requires workers to review
all spousal and child support orders and to pressure women to seek increased
support. The mandatory obligation to seek support without reference to the
wishes of the recipient has long been the subject of bitter complaint from some
recipients, who argue that it forces them into a legal system which is easily
manipulated by men to harass them, with no attendant benefit.
72
69. The initial (November 1993) Enhanced Verification policy on medical reports/reviews
was particularly offensive, instructing workers to complete a narrative of their observa-
tions of the client "at the office and not in the presence of the client". Observations
were to include, for example, whether the client was "friendly, cooperative". Represen-
tatives of the disability community objected strongly, arguing that income maintenance
workers were not trained or qualified to diagnose disabilities and that such narrative
reports would be uninformed and prejudicial. The proposed process was amended as a
result.
70. Appeals of disability eligibility determinations have traditionally made up roughly a
quarter of all appeals to SARB. This is particularly unfair to recipients in some parts of
the province, as the initial eligibility determination is highly arbitrary, with acceptance
rates ranging from approximately 40% to 80% of all applicants, depending on the office
where the application is made.
71. The Enhanced Verification policy now requires school attendance verification forms
only with respect to dependent children over 16, although it appears that some delivery
sites are still attempting to require the form for all school aged children.
72. Child and spousal support payments are deducted from social assistance allowances
dollar for dollar in Ontario (unlike some jurisdictions which allow a limited flow-
through of support).
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More importantly, sole support parents are specifically targetted by Enhanced
Verification for investigation. The Enhanced Verification policy includes iden-
tification of "high risk" cases to be targetted for "priority verification". 73 It is
no accident that the number of reports from various sources of women being
harassed by eligibility review officers erupted after the start of the "anti-fraud"
campaign.
Finally, the nature of the eligibility rules for sole support mothers is such that
even allegations or suspicions about them can have particularly severe conse-
quences. For example, an allegation that a woman was living with an unreported
spouse implies the possibility of a fraud charge, the loss of custody of children
or at the very least an overpayment which could easily run into thousands or
tens of thousands of dollars.
The most positive thing that can be said for sole support mothers on assistance
in Ontario is that worse did not happen. There is a growing hostility within the
Ontario government to the current eligibility standards for sole support parent
benefits and it is clear that the government would like to restrict them. It is an
open secret that some Cabinet members would like to see the cohabitation period
for determining spousal status reduced from three years to one, and to impose
employment-seeking obligations on these parents much sooner than the law
presently allows.74 However, while none of these changes have yet materialized,
pressures in this area are certain to increase.
(c) Future Directions
We close with a few observations on the future directions of some policy
initiatives currently under way within MCSS, as well as some of the larger
implications for social assistance of other social policy initiatives.
(i) Pending issues
In the summer of 1994 MCSS released a "workplan" indicating Ministry
priorities for policy development over the next year (which encompasses the
duration of the current government's mandate).
75
73. MCSS Social Assistance Programs Branch: Briefing Package #1, Casefile Investigation
(28 March 1994) 8. The "high risk" category has been carried forward into the
Enhanced Verification policy.
74. Ontario's rules in this regard are relatively generous, essentially allowing benefits to
continue throughout secondary school. In some jurisdictions conditionality rules begin
to operate when children are as young as one year old.
75. The "workplan" is not a formal publication of the Ministry, but an informal summary of
the Ministry's proposed initiatives.
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Some initiatives could be positive, such as the development of a consistent
Ministry-wide policy for responding to situations of family violence, 76 a code
of conduct for workers, new delivery standards and better worker training.
Other initiatives are more troubling. Of these, some are further cost-recovery
measures which will cause more financial hardship to recipients, such as a plan
to recover "administrative error" overpayments (which are currently not recov-
ered). Some are simply further reflections of the government's ideological
capitulation to anti-welfare sentiment, such as a proposal that shelter costs
should paid directly to landlords to prevent the "abuse" by recipients of not
paying rent. Some, however, indicate deeper structural changes to social assis-
tance administration. The issue of greatest concern here is an initiative innocu-
ously entitled "outcome planning", which is intended to "ensure that the
approach of identifying and monitoring specific outcomes, introduced through
the Casefile Investigation initiative, is expanded and incorporated into regular
MCSS business practice". Those familiar with similar US "initiatives" around
the Aid For Dependent Children program will be cognizant of the cause for
alarm.
77
The most important pending event, however, is the provincial election which
must be held in 1995. Social assistance will be a major election issue, and
the provincial Tories (who engage in frequent and vociferous welfare bash-
ing) intend to run on an anti-welfare platform, which promises the introduc-
tion of welfare police (to match the infamous Quebec "bou bou macoutes"),
distinctly lower rates and mandatory workfare and learnfare programs.
7 8
(ii) National issues
We close this section with some observations on the possible impact that the
current federal social security review may have on social assistance programs.
76. Development of a "family violence" protocol was a response to a legal clinics' initia-
tive. At the time of writing a draft position paper has been circulated for comment and
the Ministry has committed to bringing in the protocol, but the timing and contents of
the final version remain uncertain. Issues of "family violence" intersect social assis-
tance rules in several places, including determining when an exemption will be granted
from the obligation to pursue child or spousal support, eligibility of 16 & 17 year-olds,
and an exemption from the automatic $100 deduction from sponsored immigrant allow-
ances.
77. See T. Casey & M. Mannix, "Quality control in public assistance: Victimizing the poor
through one-sided accountability" (1989) Clearinghouse Review 1381.
78. The promise to cut rates and impose workfare is contained in the party's election plat-
form as outlined in The Common Sense Revolution (1994). Tory politicians routinely
assert gross exaggerations of the probable extent of welfare fraud in Ontario and have
often expressed their approval of the Quebec model of welfare policing.
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The federal government released Agenda: Jobs & Growth, the long-awaited
discussion paper on its options for restructuring federal social security programs
and spending in October, 1994.
79
The release came as business and the financial sector launched a fierce and
carefully orchestrated campaign to convince Canadians that we are near bank-
ruptcy as a nation and have no choices except to make massive cuts to social
spending.
80
Human Resources Minister Lloyd Axworthy's embarrassment over the discus-
sion paper commenced immediately. The release of Agenda: Jobs and Growth
was overshadowed by another leaked government document which stated that
the federal government intended to take another $7.5 billion out of social
spending by 1999.81 Mr. Axworthy attempted to deny that this document
reflected the government's real intentions, but his denials were not believable,
and, indeed, Finance Minister Paul Martin has subsequently made it clear that
he is looking at even further and deeper cuts.
There were no big surprises in the discussion paper. Drafts of the paper and
information about internal government discussions had been leaked almost daily
since the review process began. Most of the paper contained a description of the
problems facing Canada's social safety net. The actual list of "key issues for
discussion" was only a few pages long.
Even without further cuts, the federal government's agenda for "reform" will
mean more poverty and hardship for low income Canadians. However, it is clear
that the goals of the federal review include substantial spending cuts to federally
funded programs, including Unemployment Insurance and cost-shared pro-
grams. Regardless of how these cuts are distributed, the results will strain
provincial social assistance programs even further. Removing billions of dollars
from the social security spending envelope can only mean a greater increase in
income inequality and poverty (unless one anticipates immediate and massive
job creation). As the income security program of last resort, social assistance
will inevitably feel the consequences of these cuts.
79. Canada, Agenda: Jobs and Growth - Improving Social Security in Canada (Human
Resources Development Canada) (Supply and Services Canada), October 1994.
80. See for example, "Wherein the mouse squeaked" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (7
October 1994) A20; T. Corcoran "Spending crisis closing in on Ottawa" The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (12 October 1994) B2; P. Cook "The bad news on the budget never
sleeps" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (12 October 1994) B2.
81. D Ferguson "Social reform price tag: $7 billion" The Toronto Star (5 October 1994)
Al.
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Just as worrisome may be the fact that the provisions of the Canada Assistance
Plan82 (CAP) will be up for discussion. CAP is best known as the federal
provincial cost-sharing program which, prior to 1990, provided a 50% federal
contribution to provincial social assistance spending (an arrangement on which
the federal government reneged in 1990 and which has the subject of a bitter
dispute between Ontario and Canada). However, CAP also establishes some
important standards for the design and administration of social assistance
programs, including the guarantee of an appeals system and a prohibition against
"workfare". 83 Any review of CAP means that these guarantees are open for
political debate-at a time when many provinces are increasingly voicing
complaints about the restrictions imposed by CAP.
Agenda: Jobs and Growth is right about one thing. Our current social safety net
has lots of problems. Unemployment Insurance and welfare should be overhauled
and improved. Canada's training and retraining strategies should be reviewed and
updated. We should make child poverty an issue for the top of the agenda. The
employment situation of disabled people in Canada is a national disgrace.
People who read Agenda: Jobs and Growth will find that it contains a less than
hidden "agenda" and will look in vain for any serious discussion about jobs or
growth. They will also look in vain for any serious suggestion that big business
or the financial community have obligations to the people from whom they
profit. The government has ruled out any deficit-fighting on the revenue side.
In short, the government has reaffirmed its commitment to the direction Cana-
dian society has been taking for over a decade-the rich will get richer and the
poor will pay for it.
2. Workers' Compensation
(a) Assessment Rates for Employers
Compensation payments made to injured workers under the Workers' Compen-
sation Act 84 are funded by assessments which the Workers' Compensation
Board (WCB) levys on employers. Employers are classified on the basis of their
business activities and the underlying injury risk, and then assigned to a rate
group. Each rate group has its own assessment rate. 85 The assessment rate based
82. RSC 1985, c. C-I.
83. See I. Morrison, "Beyond Cost-sharing: The Canada Assistance Plan and National Wel-
fare Standards" (Clinic Resource Office: 1994).
84. R.S.O. 1990, c. W- 1I, as amended. Hereinafter the WCA.
85. In 1993, the average assessment rate for employers was $2.95 per $100.00 of payroll.
The highest rate was approximately $18.50 per $100.00 and the lowest rate was $0.21
per $100.00 of payroll; See Humphrey, Loewen & McArthur, Ontario Workers' Com-
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on an employer's classification is then applied to the assessable payroll of that
employer to determine the amount that the employer must pay to the WCB in
any given year.
In January of 1993 the WCB adopted a new classification scheme, which was
meant to ensure a closer relationship between an employer's assessments,
business activities and injury risk.86 In the fall of 1993 the WCB announced
the assessment rates it was planning to charge employers for 1994. This rate
increase was meant to cover the costs of new claims, the administrative
overhead and legislative obligations of the WCB and to assist in the long
term elimination of the unfunded liability of the WCB. 87 The average assess-
ment rate increase was to be 3 per cent. However, this rate increase was also
to be applied to the new classification scheme which the WCB had adopted.
The resulting increase in the level of assessments paid by many employers
produced outrage and indignation in the employer community.8 8 Opposition
politicians hounded the Minister of Labour over these "job-killing rate
increases". 89 As with many issues in workers' compensation, debate over this
increase proceeded along partisan lines, with neither employers nor politicians
being able (or at least willing) to explain these increases properly.
The purpose of the new classification scheme was to ensure that those employers
and industries who had high accident rates had higher assessment rates and those
who had lower accident rates had lower assessment rates. In many situations
under the old classification system low risk employers were subsidizing high
risk employers. Therefore, regardless of whether there was an assessment rate
increase for 1994, many employers would have been faced with higher assess-
ment rates simply by reclassification. The 3 per cent increase in the average rate
simply magnified the effect of switching to the new classification system.
pensation - An Employer's Guide 2nd Edition (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) at 9-6.
86. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board: Annual Report 1992 at 13. In fact, this was the
first review and change to the classification system used by the WCB since its
inception. The new classification scheme increased the number of rate groups from 108
to 219.
87. Workers' Compensation Board of Ontario: Annual Report 1993 at 17. In fact, employ-
ers had not been charged the full rate associated with the new classification scheme for
1993.
88. "1994 Assessment Rates: WCB Responds to Business Lobbying" (February, 1994) 8:1
Ontario Workers' Compensation Review I and James Rusk "Rae refuses to roll back
WCB fee hike" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (7 December, 1993) B3.
89. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), (6 December
1993) at 4537.
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What the employer community (and the opposition politicians who supported
their complaints) were saying was that, at least in the present economic climate,
they could not afford to pay the total cost of the accidents they were causing.
This may or may not have been a valid economic argument. The WCB however,
continued to be responsible to pay benefits to those workers who were injured
on the job. To the extent that employers did not pay the full amount required to
cover those costs, the Board's unfunded liability grew. Yet, as will be evident
below, the unfunded liability was an unparallelled symbol for employers of the
WCB's mismanagement and financial irresponsibility !90
(b) "Restructuring" at the WCB
In December of 1993 a major shakeup of the upper echelons of the WCB began.
Four senior executives left the Board. 9 1 There were several other internal
promotions. 92 According to the Board, the changes were a result of the "social
contract 9 3 and operational planning. However, even though the employer
community and opposition politicians had interminably been calling for changes
at the Board, these changes did not satisfy them. They wanted the removal of
the WCB chairman. 9
4
They were not disappointed. As part of the introduction of its workers' compen-
sation reform package the government announced that the chair of the WCB,
Odoardo Di Santo and the vice-chair of administration, Brian King, would be
"stepping down" at the end of their terms of office. 95 In their place the
90. In fact, the employers' arguments carried the day. The WCB Board of Directors agreed
to place a cap on the increase in premiums which resulted from this new classification
system and the increase in the average rate; see "1994 Assessment Rates: WCB
Responds to Business Lobbying", supra, note 88 at 2.
91. Sam van Clief, Senior Vice-President of Client Services Division and Henry MacDon-
ald, a department head in Client Services Division, "retired". Robert Coke, Senior Vice-
President of Finance and Administration and Sig Walters, Senior Vice-President of
Human Resources and Client Appeals resigned; see "Major WCB Executive Shakeup
and Restructuring", (14 December 1993) Vol 6:4 I.A.V.G.O. Reporting Service News-
letter at 2.
92. Catherine Rellinger (already the Chief Vocational Rehabilitation Officer) became the
Senior Vice-President of Client Services. Glen Cooper (already the Chief Financial
Officer) had his position combined with the duties of Senior Vice-President of Finance
and Administration. Linda Jolley (already the Senor Vice-President of Strategic Policy
and Analysis Division) became the Senior Vice-President of Human Resources and Cli-
ent Appeals; see Ibid. at 2.
93. For a discussion of the "social contract" see Review 1993 at 5.
94. M. Gibb-Clark, "Four WCB executives leave in "restructuring" The [Toronto] Globe
and Mail (10 December 1993) B5 and Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report
of Debates (Hansard), (9 December 1993) at 4793-4795.
95. The government introduced its reform proposals on April 14, 1994. The proposals and
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government installed a transition team, which included WCB and government
officials and representatives from business and labour.9 6 There was no repre-
sentative of injured workers on the transition team.
97
The purpose of this transition team was to assist in the implementation of the
government's reform proposals. It was to act as a sounding board for the
business, labour and injured worker communities to ensure that the proposals
addressed their concerns. It was also to "advise" the current Board of Directors
to make sure that any actions which they took before the passage of the new
legislation would be in keeping with intent of that legislation. 9 8
(c) Board of Directors Draft Strategic Plan
In 1992 the Board of Directors established a Strategic Planning Coordinating
Committee (SPCC) to develop a five year strategic plan for the WCB. The plan
was required to "(provide) direction to the organization and (coordinate) its
activities by focussing them on common goals". 99 The Board of Directors felt
that this process must examine such issues as the changing nature of the
workplace, governance and adminstration, and revenues and funding. 100 The
Draft Strategic Plan 1994 which evolved out of this process, while good in parts,
included some potentially serious incursions on the historic compromise upon
which workers' compensation is founded.
The Draft Strategic Plan 1994 adopted the following as a mission statement:
their subsequent history will be discussed below. Di Santo and King's terms of office
expired in April, 1994.
96. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), (14 April 1994)
at 5620-5621.
97. The team was to be headed by William Blundell, former president and CEO of General
Electric. Ken Copeland, former president and CEO of Digital Equipment of Canada Ltd
and one of the employer representatives on the Premier's Labour Management Advi-
sory Committee (PLMAC), was appointed interim vice-chair of adminstration on May
18, 1994. He was also a member of the transition team. Other members of the transition
team included the Deputy Minister of Management Board, the Secretary of Cabinet, the
Special Assistant to the Minister of Labour. Approved observers of the process
included the president of the Ontario Federation of Labour, the Director of the Office of
the Worker Advisor and a member of the employer working group from the PLMAC;
see "Interim Vice-Chair of Administration Appointed to the WCB" (16 August 1994)
Vol 7:3 I.A.V.G.O. Reporting Service Newsletter at 1-2 and "Transition Team at the
WCB Laying the Groundwork for Bill 165" (16 August 1994) Vol 7:3 I.A.V.G.O.
Reporting Service Newsletter at 2.
98. Ibid. "Transition Team at the WCB Laying the Groundwork for Bill 165" at 2.
99. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Planning for the Future Draft Strategic Plan
1994, Board of Directors (28 January 1994) at 1.
100. Ibid. at 6.
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To make the system work-humanely, fairly, and promptly-for the benefit of
workers, dependants and employers.
One wonders why a system which was devised to compensate workers who were
injured on the job must be made to work "humanely, fairly and promptly" for
employers? Injured workers' entitlement to benefits should not be balanced
against "fairness" to employers.
The Draft Strategic Plan 1994 also adopted the "financial viability and sus-
tainability of the system" as one of its seven goals. 10 1 At first glance this goal
seems innocuous, and even contains some good strategic action for achieving
this end, such as making the establishment of good standing with the WCB a
condition for the eligibility for business registrations, licensing, government
grants and incentives. 102 However, there are other actions suggested which are
particularly troublesome, such as finding ways of "reducing the duration of
benefits without impacting unfairly on injured workers" or "contracting out
WCB services". 
103
In truth however, the tenor of the Draft Strategic Plan 1994 may be of little
import. As with many other things in the field of workers' compensation, the
Draft Strategic Plan 1994 has been overtaken by legislative and political events.
(d) Amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act
In 1992 the Premier of Ontario established the Premier's Labour Management
Advisory Committee (PLMAC). The PLMAC was made up of representatives
from business and labour and was created to devise ways in which Ontario could
achieve economic renewal. In May of 1993 the Premier asked the PLMAC to
conduct a review of the province's workers' compensation system. 104
The PLMAC released a "framework agreement" in March, 1994 although both
labour and management had their own versions of the agreement reached. 105
101. Ibid. at 17. The other goals were: a) ensuring that workers, surviving dependants and
employers receive benefits and services in a fair, effective and timely manner; b) pro-
viding effective management in an environment which values and respects employees
and clients; c) encouraging safe and healthy workplaces; d) ensuring workers receive
rehabilitation and re-employment services which will maximize their potential for inde-
pendence and return to meaningful employment; e) ensuring an effective system for
providing benefits and services to occupationally diseased workers and their surviving
dependants; and f) improving the workers' compensation system.
102. Ibid. at 23.
103. Ibid.
104. "PLMAC: Initiatives to WCB Reform" (February, 1994) Vol 8:1 Ontario Workers'
Compensation Review 6.
105. Labour's version was called the "WCB Reform Conceptual Agreement".
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There were major areas of agreement between the two versions. Both agreed
that there should be a Royal Commission to study all aspects of the workers'
compensation system. They agreed that the board of directors should be strictly
bipartite and that its primary focus should be on the fiduciary interest of the
WCB. They also agreed that a "purpose clause" should be added to the WCA
which would declare that workers are entitled to "fair compensation" and that
the board of directors would be required to exercise the highest level of financial
responsibility and accountability in administering the system. Finally, they also
agreed that workers' compensation benefits should no longer have full protec-
tion from inflation, but rather should only be partially indexed, according to the
"Friedland" formula. 
10 6
There were also some significant discrepancies between the two agreements.
The labour version stated that certain benefits would still retain full inflation
protection, while the business version simply said that some recipients may need
"special consideration". 107 The business version of the agreement stated that
business and labour had agreed that there was to be a "financially responsible
framework", although the labour agreement made no mention of this fact.
Finally, the labour version stated that it was agreed that unemployed injured
workers who were injured prior to 1990 and were eligible for a WCB pension
would receive a $200 monthly increase in their pensions. The business version
of the agreement simply stated that such workers may require some special
treatment with respect to their pensions.
The PLMAC agreement was heralded by business, labour and government. 108
However, within a month after its release business and labour were pronouncing
it dead. 109 Despite this, the Premier announced in the Legislature a series of
Management's version was called "WCB Reform Framework".
106. The "Friedland" formula is a reference to the formula which was recommended by the
Task Force on Inflation Protection of Employee Pension Plans. The formula adopted in
the PLMAC agreement (and eventually adopted in the legislative amendments, dis-
cussed below) was less favourable to beneficiaries (in this case, injured workers) than
that proposed by the Task Force. Basically, the formula only allows for the indexation
of benefits to a percentage of the Consumer Price Index. Further, the percentage
increase in the level of benefits is capped at 4%. Therefore, if inflation was 6.7% or
greater, injured workers would receive only a 4% increase in their benefits.
107. The recipients to receive full inflation protection were people receiving survivor and
dependant benefits, 100% pensions, 100% future economic loss benefits and some
unemployed old Act injured workers.
108. M. Mittelstaedt, "House cleaning urged for Ontario WCB" The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail(12 March 1994) B1.
109. M. Mittelstaedt, "OFL incensed as WCB reform pact dies" The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (1 April 1994) B4. The area of major disagreement was the terms of the payment
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amendments to the WCA and the creation of a Royal Commission into the
workers' compensation system. l0 To a great extent, the legislative amendments,
eventually introduced by the Minister of Labour in May, 1994, mirrored much
of the PLMAC agreement.1 1' There was to be a bipartite board of directors. A
purpose clause was to be added to the WCA, although the requirement that the
board of directors act in a financially responsible and accountable manner was
to be placed in the part of the Act dealing with the board's duties. The Friedland
formula was to be applied to almost all benefits paid by the WCB. Finally, there
was to be provision for the payment of an additional $200 to older injured
workers who were receiving permanent disability pensions, if the worker would
have been entitled to a supplement to that pension.
During the public hearings into the bill, much of the focus of injured workers
and injured worker advocates was on the implications of the Friedland formula
and the proposal for the payment of the $200.112 Injured workers had fought for
years to get benefit levels indexed to inflation, which finally occurred in 1988.
The Friedland formula removed that protection. It would be an annual, legislated
reduction in benefits. The only justification offered by the government was that
the reduction in benefits was necessary in order to reduce the unfunded liabil-
ity. 113 In fact, the application of the Friedland formula also insured that employ-
ers compensation costs would not rise above a set level in any one year. This
type of financial certainty would be a boon to employers. The financial uncer-
tainty which the Friedland formula would wreak on injured workers seems to
have been of little concern.
At first glance, one of the few positive aspects of the government's reform
package was the $200 payment to certain older injured workers. 114 However, it
of the $200 to old Act injured workers.
110. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Reports of Debate (Hansard), (14 April 1994)
at 5620. At the time of writing (some six months after the Premier's announcement) the
terms of reference, the timelines for reporting and the members of the Royal Commis-
sion have still not been announced.
111. Bill 165, An Act to amend the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational
Health and Safety Act received first reading on May 18, 1994. It received second read-
ing on June 14-15, 1994 and was referred to the Standing Committee on Resources
Development for public hearings.
112. The Standing Committee on Resources Development held public hearings on Bill 165
during the last two weeks of August and the first week of September in Toronto, Lon-
don, Sault Ste. Marie and Ottawa.
113. Supra, note 110.
114. Ironically, one of the reasons that these older workers were in poverty was the lack of
inflation protection for their benefits prior to 1988. Further, the $200 payment was to be
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soon became apparent that what the government claimed and what the legisla-
tion actually said were two different things. The government said that the $200
was to be added to the lifetime pensions of these injured workers. 115 The
legislation stated that the $200 would only be payable to those who are entitled
to a supplement to their pension. However, a supplement can be terminated for
any number of reasons and the failure to maintain eligibility for a supplement
would effect the eligibility for the $200 increase. Further, the government stated
that the $200 payment would not be subject to the "social assistance
clawback". 116 The legislation contained no such guarantee, although during the
public hearings the parliamentary assistant to the Minister of Labour stated that
the Minister of Community and Social Services had assured her that the $200
would not be subject to the "clawback".11 7
The Standing Committee on Resources Development was to have begun a
clause by clause consideration of the amendments during the last week of
September, 1994. On the first day of that clause by clause analysis over
seventy pages of amendments were introduced by all three parties. The
government amendments proposed placing the requirement that the board of
directors "act in a financially accountable and responsible manner" into the
new purpose clause. The provisions governing the payment of the $200 to
older injured workers were to be changed so that entitlement to the $200
could reduce the amount of a supplement which a worker was receiving, and
entitlement to Old Age Security benefits could reduce the amount paid to
older injured workers below the $200 amount specified. Finally, the indexing
of all Future Economic Loss awards was no longer to be subject to the
funded out of the money saved by de-indexing most other benefits.
115. This claim was made by the Premier in his initial announcement, by the parliamentary
assistant to the Minister of Labour on second reading of the Bill, and by the Minister of
Labour in his opening address to the Standing Committee on Resources Development.
116. Supra, note 110. The "social assistance clawback" is a reference to the provisions con-
tained in the regulations under the Family Benefits Act and the General Welfare Assis-
tance Act whereby each dollar of outside income reduces the social assistance
entitlement by a dollar. This guarantee by the government was of some importance
because of the number of older injured workers who were also receiving social assis-
tance (in part due to the size of their pensions).
117. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Resources Development, Offi-
cial Reports of Debates (Hansard), No. R-46 (7 September 1994) at 1285. The diffi-
culty with this assurance is that the regulations under the Family Benefits Act or the
General Welfare Assistance Act can be changed overnight by the Cabinet. An Act of
the Legislature can only be changed by the Legislature. Thus the best way to ensure that
the money was not subject to the clawback would be to have included such a provision
in Bill 165.
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Friedland formula, but unfortunately would be subject to an even more complex
indexingformula. 118
The Standing Committee only conducted five days of clause by clause analysis
before they adjourned. Reports are that all committee members were confused
over the implications of the deindexation of benefits proposed in the amend-
ments. Committee members were supposed to receive individual briefings on
this issue from Ministry of Labour staff. It was not known when the Standing
Committee would resume its hearings, but the government had stated that the
passage of the amendments was one of its foremost objectives when the
Legislature resumed sitting in November, 1994.
(e) Litigation Developments
(i) Charter Challenge to Future Economic Loss (FEL) provisions
In Yolkowski v Attorney General of Ontario119 the applicant is seeking a
declaration that section 43(2) of the Workers' Compensation Act violates the
equality rights section of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section
43 of the WCA provides that workers who have suffered compensable injuries
are entitled to compensation for future loss of earnings. However, section 43(2)
states that the eligibility for such compensation ceases when the worker turns
sixty five years of age. In Yolkowski the applicant was sixty six years of age at
the time of his injury. He therefore did not even qualify for a future loss of
earnings award. He intends to argue that this prohibition constitutes discrimina-
tion on the basis of age. It is anticipated that this case will not be heard until
sometime in 1995.
(ii) Judicial Review of WCAT's application of the Presumption Clause
In Decision No. 82/93120 the worker had suffered a heart attack while driving a
truck on a remote road in Northern Ontario. There were no witnesses to the
accident. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal accepted that the
worker had suffered a "personal injury by accident" and that the accident had
occurred "in the course of his employment". The panel was then required to
118. The application of the Friedland formula to Future Economic Loss awards highlighted
the most egregious aspects of the indexing formula. This point was made forcefully by
injured workers and advocates during the public hearings. The amendments introduced
by the government appeared to be an attempt to remedy this situation. However, the
improvement will only be slight.
119. Court File # 7324/93, Ontario Court (General Division). The applicant is represented by
the Renfrew County Legal Clinic.
120. (20 May 1993; Cook, Thompson, Apsey). The applicant in this case is actually the
widow of the deceased worker, who is seeking survivor's benefits under the WCA. The
applicant is represented by the Kinna-Aweya Legal Clinic in Thunder Bay.
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apply section 4(3) of the WCA (the presumption clause) which stated that, where
an accident occurred in the course of a worker's employment, it was to be
presumed that the accident arose out of his employment "unless the contrary is
shown". 12 1 The panel stated that "(t)he available evidence does not, in our view,
establish either clearly or convincingly, what happened". 122 On its face this
statement demonstrates that the panel did not view the evidence as establishing
on a balance of probabilities that there was some other reason for the worker's
heart attack. Therefore, they should have concluded that the presumption in
section 4(3) had not been rebutted.
Inexplicably, the panel went on to consider the evidence which was available
and appear to have concluded that it was not probable that the accident arose
out of the worker's employment. However, this is exactly what the presumption
clause tells them they should conclude "unless the contrary is shown". This
aspect of the decision is the subject of a judicial review in Tempelman and the
Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal. 123
The result in this decision is of importance for two reasons. First, the court may
be called upon to decide what standard of proof is applicable in rebutting the
presumption. In the past there have been numerous attempts by the WCAT to
articulate this standard, ranging from a "balance of probabilities" to "beyond a
reasonable doubt", with no clear standard emerging. 124 Second, and more
importantly, the court will have to decide what must be "shown" in order to rebut
the presumption. The applicant is arguing that it is necessary to establish a
specific cause of the injury which is not work-related before the contrary can be
shown. The panel in Decision No. 82/93 concluded that, as there was no
reasonable possibility that the accident arose out of the worker's employment,
it had been "shown" that the accident did not arise out of employment. Whatever
the outcome of this decision, it will definitely have an impact on workers'
compensation casework.
121. As a general rule an accident must arise out of and in the course of employment in
order for it to be compensable. There were also many other issues in the case. However,
the focus here is on the issue which has given rise to the judicial review.
122. Supra, note 120 at 21.
123. Court File # 63/94, Ontario Court (General Division) Divisional Court. The applicant is
again represented by the Kinna-Aweya Legal Clinic in Thunder Bay.
124. For a discussion of this issue see Dee, McCombie & Newhouse, Butterworths Workers'
Compensation In Ontario Service (Toronto, 1993) at 7.2-7.4.
(1994) 10 Journal of Law and Social Policy
(iii) Mandamus Granted against Workers' Compensation Board
In Furac v. Ontario (Workers' Compensation Board)125 the Divisional Court
granted the mandamus application of a worker which compelled the Workers'
Compensation Board (WCB) to implement a decision of its Decision Review
Branch (DRB). Pursuant to a DRB decision made in September of 1990, the
worker had been granted benefits for a period from March 1986 until
September of 1989. Despite this decision the WCB only paid the worker
benefits for the period up to October, 1986. The worker spent three years
trying to get the WCB to implement its own decision before successfully
applying for mandamus.
The decision in Furac is apparently the first time that mandamus has been
ordered against the WCB. People with little familiarity with the WCB might
wonder how the WCB could refuse to implement its own decision. Injured
workers and their advocates will not find this difficult to comprehend at all, and
for this reason the decision in Furac may have some positive effect. The court's
decision also seems to imply that mandamus is available "to enforce a duty
created by an agency's own policies and procedures". 126 Thus the decision may
also have some impact outside the workers compensation context.
(iv) WCAT's First Non-Economic Loss (NEL) Award Decision
Decision No. 269/93127 was the WCAT's first decision on non-economic loss
awards. While the reasons in that decision are somewhat factually specific, the
panel made some interesting observations about the WCB's use of the American
Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairmentl2 8 in
the NEL assessment process.
Essentially, NEL awards are meant to compensate for any permanent impair-
ment that the worker suffers from a compensable injury. A combination of the
worker's age and the degree of his or her permanent impairment are used to
determine the worker's entitlement. Section 42(5) of the WCA states that the
WCB shall determine the degree of a worker's permanent impairment in
125. (16 November 1993) Court File # 344/93 Ontario Court (General Division) Divisional
Court [unreported].
126. 3 R.A.L. 79. As advocates will know, the WCB's appeal system is entirely administra-
tive in design (see Workers' Compensation Board Operational Policy Manual Docu-
ment No. 01-01-05). It is not derived from the WCA.
127. (28 April 1994; Mclntosh-Janis, Apsey, Thompson).
128. The full title is American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment (3rd ed., revised). Hereinafter AMA Guides.
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accordance with the prescribed "rating schedule". Section 15(1) of Regulation
1102129 sets out the AMA Guides as the "rating schedule" to be used.
The panel in Decision No. 269/93 noted that the Board medical consultants and
co-ordinators do not seem to take a consistent approach in applying the AMA
Guides. Correspondence provided to the panel by the WCB outlined several
examples of how the Board reads and applies the Guides. The panel stated that
these examples (and as many others as possible) should be made available to
the public. The panel also recommended that a simple step-by-step guide should
be made available, for use by the medical consultants and co-ordinators and by
the public, which would make it easier to assess the accuracy of the Board's
NEL awards.
1 30
Finally, the panel held that where the AMA Guides covered a specific "type of
impairment", the WCB had no discretion to exercise in applying them. The
worker had argued that the WCB did not correctly compare the findings which
were made in the NEL assessment process with the criteria outlined in the AMA
Guides. The worker's type of impairment was listed in the AMA Guides,
although his degree of impairment fell in between the range of impairment
ratings provided in the AMA Guides. The WCB attempted to "amend" the AMA
Guides by adopting a range of impairment rating which was in between the
ranges listed in the Guides. The panel concluded that the WCB was statutorily
prohibited from doing this, as such a determination of the worker's impairment
would not be "in accordance with" the AMA Guides.
13 1
3. Unemployment Insurance
(a) Legislative Changes in 1994
As in 1993, amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act 132 were
announced as part of fiscal restraint legislation rather than as part of com-
prehensive social legislation. 133 These amendments made a further reduction
129. R.R.O. 1990, as amended.
130. Supra, note 127 at 6-7.
131. Supra, note 127 at 15. The panel also noted several other instances where the WCB's
practices were not in accordance with the AMA Guides. It seems apparent that injured
workers and advocates will be required to scrutinize Board assessments in NEL cases to
insure that the Board has in fact applied the AMA Guides properly.
132. R.S.C. 1985, Chap. U-I, as amended. Hereinafter UIA.
133. Budget Implementation Act, 1994, S.C. 1994, c.18, assented to on June 15, 1994. Part V
of the Act which addresses the amendments to the UIA, came into force on July 3, 1994
by Proclamation: SI/94-82, Canada Gazette, Part H, Vol. 128, No. 14, p. 2776 (July 13,
1994). With the exception of s. 15, the rest of the Act came into force on the date of
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in the basic benefit rate from 57% to 55%. However, the amendments also
introduced a second tier of benefits for claimants with low earnings and
dependants. This second tier will be an "enhanced rate", where the benefit rate
will be 60% of earnings. This needs-based assessment is more consistent with
social assistance legislation than with legislation that is supposed to be an
insurance scheme paid for with significant contributions by the claimant. 
134
The amendments will also make it more difficult to qualify for UI. The minimum
entrance requirement is increased to 12 weeks from 10.135 Although the maxi-
mum number of weeks of benefit remains 50, a further amendment makes a
significant reduction in the number of people who will qualify to receive this
maximum. 136 As well, there are significant reductions in the numbers of weeks
of entitlement throughout this new amendment.
Given the harsh effects of the current sections 28 and 30 of the UIA, 13 7 the 1994
amendments can (at least in part) be seen as remedial. First, the "benefit of the
doubt" in favour of claimants is now to be legislated with respect to determina-
tions made under s. 28. Second, a claimant suspended from employment due to
misconduct will no longer be disentitled for the entire period of the claim. The
claimant will only be temporarily disqualified while the period of suspension is
in effect. Third, a claimant who takes an employer-approved voluntary leave of
absence will only be disqualified from receiving benefits during the period of
the leave. Previously the claimant would have been considered to have volun-
tarily left employment without just cause and would have been entirely disen-
titled from receiving UI benefits otherwise arising from the employment. A
fourth change affects claimants who quit or are fired in a three week period prior
to layoff. The claimant will be disqualified from receiving benefits until the date
the layoff would have taken effect. Previously the claimant would not have been
Royal Assent.
134. Some have suggested that this signals the demise of the UI system as we know it. It is
feared that there will be greater reliance on means testing and that the insurance element
will be eliminated.
135. Table 1, UIA.
136. Table 2, UIA.
137. These harsh results were effected by the 1993 amendments which deny benefits to
claimants who have quit or been fired. Previous to the 1993 changes, there was a 7 to
12 week disqualification imposed on claimants. After the period of disqualification,
claimants were eligible to receive their regular benefits, albeit at a reduced rate of 50%.
This penalty had not existed prior to 1990. Moreover, prior to 1990 the period of dis-
qualification was from 1 to 6 weeks. The issue of the reduced benefit rate is discussed
later in the discussion of the UI jurisprudence. For a further discussion of the 1993
amendments see Review 1993 at 331-32.
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entitled to benefits at all. In each of these situations, despite the existence of
disqualifying factors, a claimant who is otherwise entitled to benefits for
sickness, maternity or parental leave, will receive benefits.
(b) Litigation Developments
(i) Jurisdictional Issues
There were a number of important decisions relating to jurisdictional issues
affecting the powers of boards of referees and umpires on appeal. In Canada v
Read138 the umpire had determined that the claimant should have had his claim
antedated, even though the Commission had not rendered a determination on
this issue. The Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the board and the umpire do
not possess jurisdiction to rule on a matter which has not been raised by the
Commission. Relying on an earlier decision,1 39 the Court held that the jurisdic-
tion on appeal was to deal only with a decision that was made by the Commis-
sion, "...not that which it might and perhaps, in the exercise of common sense,
should have made."
140
A similar jurisdictional issue was considered by the Federal Court of Appeal in
Canada v Kolish. 14 1 In that case the Court ruled that only the Commission had
the jurisdiction to determine the duration of the reduction of benefits under s.
30(7) of the UIA. 142 As the Commission had not done so, the Court concluded
that the umpire was wrong to determine this issue on appeal. 143
138. [1994] F.C.J. No. 359 (Fed. C.A.) [unreported], Appeal No. A-371-93.
139. Hamilton v Canada (1988), 91 N.R. 145 (Fed. C.A.).
140. Ibid., at 145. However, in Canada v Easson (1994), 167 N.R. 232 (Fed. C.A.), the court
held that a board of referees was justified in determining that there was no misconduct
under the UIA s. 28, and substituting a determination that there had been a voluntary
leaving of employment without just cause under s. 28. Despite the fact that the Com-
mission decision under appeal related to a disqualification for losing employment due
to misconduct, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the two grounds are "linked". The
court stated: "Legally speaking, the subject matter of the appeal...was a disqualification
under s. 28", Easson at 234.
141. (1994), 167 N.R. 107 (Fed. C.A.).
142. Section 30(7) states that the rate of benefit shall be reduced to 50% where a claimant is
disqualified under s. 27 of the UIA. Prior to the 1993 amendments, this section had also
applied to claimants who were subject to disqualifications imposed under s. 28 of the
UIA: i.e., misconduct and voluntary leaving of employment without just cause.
143. The absurdity of the result in Kolish is that the Court referred the matter back to the
umpire, to refer the matter back to the board, to refer the matter back to the Commis-
sion. What remains unclear is whether there is a right of appeal to a board and the
umpire once the Commission has exercised that discretion. The appeal provisions of the
UIA provide that there is a right of appeal from "a decision" of the Commission: s. 79
and s. 80, UIA. One would think that this would apply to any decision the Commission
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The Commission had also always taken the position that the reduction of
benefits under section 30(7) applied automatically for the duration of the full
claim period. The Federal Court of Appeal in Archambault v Canada144 dis-
agreed. The Court held that the clear wording of s. 30(7) required the Commis-
sion to determine the duration of the reduced benefit period. The Commission
had to exercise this discretion and had not done so.
The issue of a board's and an umpire's jurisdiction with respect to penalties
imposed by the Commission under s. 33(1) of the UIA has also been open to
dispute among umpires. 145 A recent Federal Court of Appeal decision seems to
have settled this matter, although in a manner unfavourable for claimants. The
Court's reasons in Canada v Smith 14 6 are unfortunately terse and do not examine
the issue in any depth. The Court simply applies the rationale developed in
earlier decisions which dealt with a different section of the Act 14 7 and held that
an umpire has no jurisdiction to substitute "his own point of view for that of the
Commission" under s. 33(l).148
Consistency in these decisions is difficult to determine. All that can be said with
certainty is that a board and umpire may not make a decision that has not been
is required to make. For some reason the Federal Court has held that this is not the case
for certain decisions which are based on the "opinion" of the Commission: e.g., see
Canada v Von Findenigg, [1984] 1 F.C. 65 (Fed. C.A.), at 71. This case dealt with what
is now s. 41(10) of the UIA and is distinguishable for that reason. The two sections con-
tain different wording and serve two very different functions.
144. (1993), 166 N.R. 299 (Fed. C.A.).
145. Section 33(1) deals with false or misleading statements or misrepresentation by claim-
ants. For a discussion of this point see Review 1993 at 37, footnote 144.
146. (1994), 167 N.R. 105 (Fed. C.A.).
147. The reasoning applied is that contained in decisions with respect to the jurisdiction of
boards and umpires under s. 41(10). These other decisions, merely cited in a footnote to
the decision, are Canada v Desjardins, [1981] 1 F.C. 220 (Fed. C.A.); Findenigg,
supra, note 143, and Harbour v. UIC (1986), 64 N.R. 267 (Fed. C.A.). The Court held
that, at best, an umpire can refer the matter back to the board with "...reasons why the
decision of the Commission should be made anew", at 107. This would seem to imply
that the board can make that decision "anew": i.e., the board is a hearing de novo.
148. Supra, note 146, at 107. In a more recent and equally terse judgment, the Federal Court
of Appeal has held that an Umpire cannot alter the penalty imposed when s/he has not
found any error on the part of the Board of Referees: Canada v Frew, [1994] F.C.J. No.
988 (Fed. C.A.) [unreported]; (Appeal #A-512-93 & #A-693-93). It is unclear from the
decision whether the Court of Appeal meant that the Umpire can only alter the penalty
if there is an error in the determination of misrepresentation, or whether it meant that
the Umpire can alter the penalty only when s/he makes a finding that the Board did not
consider mitigating factors. In view of Canada v Smith, it is probably the former mean-
ing which is applicable to this decision.
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made by the Commission. What the appellate body must do is refer the matter
back for a decision by the Commission. Indeed, Smith 149 has muddied the
waters, by suggesting that a board can make a decision as a de novo tribunal
which the Commission ought to have made, but an umpire cannot.
A final jurisdictional issue was raised in Canada v Maughan. 150 This case dealt
with the issue of voluntary leaving of employment. On appeal the Board had
reduced the period of disqualification below the statutory minimum of 7
weeks. 15 1 The Commission appealed and the Umpire then determined that there
was just cause for leaving and that no disqualification was mandated.
The Federal Court of Appeal held that the umpire had exceeded his jurisdiction
by overturning the findings of fact of the Board without ruling that the Board's
decision was "perverse". 1
52
(ii) Moving to a Place of Fewer Employment Opportunities
The Federal Court of Appeal released four decisions at the same time dealing with the
issue of claimants who moved to an area with fewer employment opportunities. These
decisions were Canada v Blondahl, 153 DeVos v Canada, 154 Canada v Higgett, 155 and
Canada v Whiffen.156 The issue in these decisions was whether the Commission had
the power to make a policy for determining "availability for employment" in such
cases. Essentially, the Commission's policy was designed to ensure that a claimant
did not act to diminish his or her opportunities for re-employment. 157
149. Supra, note 146.
150. (1994), 164 N.R. 237 (Fed. C.A.).
151. This matter arose before the 1993 amendments. After 1993, the claimant would not
have been eligible at all.
152. Section 80 of the UIA provides three ground for an appeal to the umpire. One ground
contained in s. 80(c) is where the board has made "...an erroneous finding of fact that it
made in a perverse or capricious manner...". However that subsection goes on to state
"or without regard to the material before it". The Court did not address this second and
distinct aspect to this ground. Further, section 80(b) provides for an appeal where a
board has erred in law. A determination of just cause is a mixed question of law and
fact: Tanguay v Unemployment Insurance Commission (1985), 68 N.R. 154 (Fed.
C.A.). Unfortunately the decision is sparse in its reasons. The Court appears to have
neglected these other grounds which are much more likely to have been the basis for
the umpire's determination as to "just cause".
153. (1994), 165 N.R. 154 (Fed C.A.).
154. (1994), 165 N.R. 152 (Fed. C.A.).
155. (1994), 165 N.R. 156 (Fed. C.A.).
156. (1994), 165 N.R. 145 (Fed. C.A.).
157. The policy required that after a reasonable period of time the claimant would have to
expand the geographical area of job search or become disentitled to benefits. The deci-
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The Federal Court held that the policy was valid but that it could not be applied
automatically without regard to the circumstances of each individual case. 158 In
Higgett, the Court held that the policy should not have been applied to an injured
worker who had moved to an area of less employment, where it was unlikely
that his job prospects were any better in the larger centre in which he had
previously resided. In Whiffen, the Court held that this policy could not be
applied where the claimant followed her husband to the new area, as s. 28(4) of
the UIA specifically sanctions this action by a claimant. 159 Therefore, the
restriction on employment could not be viewed as self-imposed. The Court
stated that the policy should only be applied where there is no such justification
for the relocation. 160
sion in Whiffen, supra, note 156, contains a good discussion of "availability" in the con-
text of s. 14 of the UIA. At 146, the Court states that "Availability is usually described
... either as a sincere desire to work demonstrated by attitude and conduct and accompa-
nied by reasonable efforts to find a job, or a willingness to reintegrate into the labour
force under normal conditions without unduly limiting one's chances of obtaining
employment." At 150, the Court adds that "... availability is to be assessed on the basis
of attitude and conduct and taking into account all the circumstances...".
158. In this regard, see especially Blondahl, supra, note 153 and Higgett, supra, note 155.
159. The same reasoning was applied in the case of a claimant who had followed her spouse,
in the subsequent decision of Canada v Kuntz, [1994] F.C.J. No. 298 (Fed. C.A.) [unre-
ported] (#A- 1485-92).
160. Supra, note 156 at 151. The same reasoning was applied in De Vos, supra, note 154 and
in Higgett, supra, note 155.
There is no good reason why the same rationale could not be applied to unmarried
persons such as common law couples or same-sex couples. In CUB-21349 (May 22,
1992; Dub, J.) held that a fiancee who followed her fiancd had just cause for leaving
employment. The Umpire reviewed the meaning of "conjoint" (spouse) in the French
language version of the statute and concluded they were spouses. A contrary ruling was
made in CUB-22033 (October 30, 1992; Teitelbaum, J.) wherein a common law spouse
was held not to be a "spouse" for the purpose of s. 28(4). Teitelbaum, J. did, however,
suggest that the UIA be expressly amended to include common law spouses.
In at least one board of referees decision, the board concluded that a claimant had just
cause for leaving employment in order to follow her same-sex partner. However, the
reason was not based on a determination that they were "spouses" but on the basis that
s. 28(4) was an open-ended list and following a same-sex spouse to a new location was
sufficiently analogous to be considered as another ground for just cause: L.J. v UIC (10
November 1993), Case No. 403-93 (Bd. of Ref.), (the claimant was represented by
Bloor Information & Legal Services). However, in CUB-23117 (October 12, 1993;
Walsh, J.), the Umpire impliedly accepted the Board's position that same-sex partners
were not "spouses". This was not a case of leaving work to follow a "spouse" but rather
it was a case of leaving work to provided medical care for an ill same-sex spouse and
the Umpire held that this would not have been just cause even for a claimant in a het-
erosexual spousal relationship. This decision is now questionable, even if it was once
justified. Prior to 1993, s. 28(4)(e) of the UIA, to which the Umpire referred, made ref-
erence only to an "obligation to care for a child,". This was amended in 1993 to further
state "...or a member of the immediate family". Arguably, prior to 1993 the obligation
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(iii) Misconduct
The Federal Court of Appeal's hard line approach to misconduct cases has again
been reaffirmed in Canada v Brissette.16 1 That case involved a truck driver
who had lost his licence as a result of a conviction for impaired driving. The
incident had occurred off the job and was unrelated to his employment.
However, the driver was dismissed from his employment. The Federal Court
of Appeal held that the misconduct must be committed by the employee
while he or she was employed by the employer, and must constitute a
breach of a duty that is express or implied in the contract of employment,
but that it was not necessary that the misconduct be committed at work,
in the workplace or in the course of the employment relationship with the
employer. 1
62
Brissette involved a consideration of the UIA as it read after the 1990 amend-
ments and prior to the 1993 amendments. It will be interesting to see if there is
a softening of the court's position in its post-1993 decisions concerning just
cause or misconduct. The ramifications of such decisions are now much more
detrimental for the claimant. 163
(iv) Just Cause For Leaving Employment
Some recent "just cause" decisions imply that where the reason for leaving falls
under one of the listed categories in s. 28(4) of the UIA, there is no requirement
to seek reasonable alternatives to leaving the employment. However, in Canada
to care for a "family" member was sufficiently similar to be covered by s. 28(4). After
1994, a same-sex partner, if not "family" is sufficiently similar to be included as an
analogous situation covered by s. 28(4). Despite acknowledging that s. 28(4) is not a
closed list, Walsh, J. treats it as closed. CUB-23117 is the subject of a judicial review
application to the Federal Court of Appeal.
161. (1993), 168 N.R. 60 (Fed. C.A.), (Appeal No. A-1342-92). There have been at least two
distinct views among Umpires as to how closely connected the conduct must be to the
performance of the job. Dubinsky, J. has defined misconduct, in CUB-5579 (June 1979;
Dubinsky, J.) and numerous other decisions, as malfeasance "connected with the work
itself'. However, Cattanach, J., in CUB-6666 (June 1981; Cattanach, J.) and other deci-
sions, has criticized the Dubinsky view of misconduct as too narrow, preferring a wider
definition more akin to the common-law definition of just cause for dismissal. The Fed-
eral Court of Appeal had not expressly adopted either position. However, the fact that it
overturned a misconduct decision by Dubinsky J in Canada v Bedell (1984), 60 N.R.
115 (F.C.A.), suggested that the court favoured a broader view of misconduct.
162. This should leave no doubt that the Court favours the Cattanach, J. approach to miscon-
duct.
163. The 1990 provisions changed the law by creating a non-exclusive list of circumstances
where just cause may exist and also increased the period of disqualification. In 1993,
more items were added to this list, but the disqualification period became an absolute
disentitlement.
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v Landry,16 4 the Federal Court of Appeal sent a matter back to the Umpire where
the Umpire had determined that there was just cause for leaving, but had not
determined the issue of "no reasonable alternative to leaving immediately".
4. Canada Pension Plan
(a) Restructuring
Responsibility for the administration of the Canada Pension Plan165 has
changed hands in the past year-at least in practice. Federal Income Security
Programs are now run by Human Resources Development Canada, a new
federal super-department which amalgamated the departments of National
Health and Welfare, Employment and Immigration, and Labour. This has had
little impact on general policy and procedure. However, the federal restruc-
turing may result in some confusion as to the appropriate respondent to be
named in any CPP appeals or judicial reviews. In July 1993, control and
supervision of the Income Security Programs Branch was transferred from
the Minister of National Health and Welfare to the Minister of Employment
and Immigration. 166 As of the date this article was written, responsibility for
the Income Security Programs had not yet been legally transferred to the
Minister of Human Resources Development, although legislation
implementing the super-department is anticipated.
(b) Vocational rehabilitation
The federal government has launched a nation-wide trial program aimed at
encouraging CPP disability pensioners to attempt to return to the workforce.
The National Vocational Rehabilitation Project (NVRP), which has relatively
limited funding to date, 167 offers rehabilitation services to selected disability
pensioners, in particular, persons who are:
164. (24 November 1993), # A-1210-92 (Fed. C.A.) [unreported].
165. R.S.C. 1985, c C-8. Hereinafter the Plan or CPP.
166. Order In Council, P.C. 1993-1488 (25 June 1993), Registration SI/93-142 (14 July
1993).
167. The program is funded under the National Strategy for the Integration of Persons with
Disabilities, and has been allotted $6 million over 5 years: See H. Beatty, "Disability
Income Programs Update" (1994) 12 ARCH.TYPE (2/3) 49 at 56-58 for further discus-
sion of the NVRP; see also Review 1992 at 35. Rehabilitation services in general are
authorized under the Canada Pension Plan Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 385, s. 69(2)
which provides that:
Where the Director is of the opinion that a person who has been determined
to be disabled within the meaning of the Act may benefit vocationally from
reasonable rehabilitation measures, he may, from time to time, require that
person to undergo such reasonable rehabilitation measures as he may specify.
Poverty Law in Ontario
" underage 50;
" not terminally ill;
" medically stable; and
" motivated and willing to participate.
168
The CPP contacts pensioners who meet the above criteria and are considered to
have "rehabilitation potential" and asks them if they are interested in taking part
in the program. The implication is that participation in the NVRP is strictly
voluntary, although pensioners will in all likelihood feel some pressure to give
their consent. The actual rehabilitation services are carried out by private
consultants under contract to CPP. These services include an initial assessment,
and may include funding for other expenses related to the pensioner's rehabili-
tation "plan", including the costs of tuition, books and additional assessments.
CPP is unlikely to pay for services through the NVRP if they can be funded by
provincial rehabilitation programs, insurers or workers' compensation. The downs-
ide to the NVRP is that anyone who takes part in the program will stop receiving a
disability pension three months after his or her rehabilitation plan is completed,
whether or not he or she has found a job. This makes the NVRP a very risky
venture for most disability pensioners. 169
(c) Auditor General's Report - Poor Service
The Auditor General of Canada, in his annual report to the House of Commons
this past year, denounced the quality and level of client service provided by the
CPP as "unacceptable". 170 The CPP has indicated that service with respect
to disability appeals is unlikely to improve until current backlogs have been
eliminated. 17 1 At the end of the 1993-94 fiscal year, the backlog of first-level
appeals exceeded 17,000 cases, with an average waiting time of almost a
168. Ibid. at 57. These criteria are also set out in a pamphlet entitled "Canada Pension Plan
National Vocational Rehabilitation Project" which is available at Income Security Pro-
grams Client Service Centres.
169. Such a denial of benefits would still be appealable. However, an appeal in these cir-
cumstances could prove to be an uphill battle because of the absence of express
statutory protection for workers participating in rehabilitation programs. See
Beatty, ibid. at 58.
170. Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons for 1993
(Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993) [hereinafter Report of the Auditor Gen-
eral] at 18.6, 18.3 1-18.40. The Report was particularly critical of the telephone service.
The Auditor General also criticized the CPP for inadequate overpayment collection and
recovery procedures, an ineffective disability reassessment process, an unstructured
management framework and a failure to provide the public with complete and timely
information on Plan administration.
171. Ibid. at 18.35.
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year. As noted by the Auditor General, current efforts to clear that backlog will
probably just shift the backlog to the Review Tribunal level. 1
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(d) Financial Reports - Poor Health
There were more gloomy prognoses this year as to the long-term health of the
CPP. For the first time in its history, the Plan was required to draw on its surplus
fund to meet its costs for the 1993-94 fiscal year. Plan officials reported a 17%
increase in disability pension payouts. While the government continues to insist
the Plan is not in jeopardy, analysts say the price of survival will be soaring
contribution rates. 173 Various reforms to the Plan have been proposed, includ-
ing:
" raising the retirement age; 174
" eliminating the basic exemption for contributions on earnings;
175
" ending automatic indexation of pensions in payment;
176
" changing the low-earnings drop-out provisions;177 and
* reducing survivor's benefits.1
78
172. Ibid. at 18.83-18.88.
173. See A. Freeman, "CPP dips into surplus fund", The Globe and Mail (21 April 1994)
B I. The Report of the Auditor General, supra, predicts that the aging of the Canadian
population will double the cost of the Plan by 2021, with the increased cost to be borne
by contributors. It states, at 18.57:
As a result, today's combined (employer and employee) contribution rate of 5 percent
will double by 2016 and climb to 13 percent by 2030.
174. D.I. Brown & J.A. Collins, "Strategies for the Long Term Survival of the Canada Pen-
sion Plan" (Board of Trade of Metropolitan Toronto, 1993) [unpublished], a letter
reporting to the Minister-Designate of Human Resources and Labour, at 2; Canadian
Institute of Actuaries, "Canadian Retirement Income Social Security Programs: Report
of the Task Force on Social Security Financing" (Ottawa, 1993), at 17-19.
175. Brown & Collins, ibid at 2; Canadian Institute of Actuaries, ibid at 15-16. Currently, no
contributions are made on earnings up to a basic exemption amount for the year ($3,400
in 1994). Pensions are, however, calculated on the basis of full earnings up to the year's
maximum pensionable earnings ($34,400 in 1994). Eliminating the basic exemption
would allow more workers to earn CPP benefits, and would permit a reduction in the
contribution rate, but would also increase the contribution burden on low income earn-
ers.
176. Brown & Collins, ibid. at 2.
177. Canadian Institute of Actuaries, supra at 16-17. Currently, up to 15% of low-earning
months may be dropped out from a contributor's contributory period in calculating his
or her average monthly pensionable earnings.
178. Ibid. at 17.
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The federal government has stated that pensions are not part of the review of social
programs which it is undertaking. However, it is difficult not to see eerie similarities
between what financial commentators are suggesting for reforming CPP and the
proposals which have been discussed above, for reforming social assistance,
workers' compensation and unemployment insurance.
(e) Administrative Error - Overpayments
The federal government decided this year not to pursue collection of over-
payments made to about 8,000 recipients of CPP survivor's benefits. The
overpayments, the average amount of which was $1,750, resulted from a
computer error. 179 Section 66(3)(d) of the Plan permits remission of an
overpayment in the event of "erroneous advice or administrative error".
(f) Litigation Developments
(i) Jurisdictional issues
The Federal Court of Appeal ruled this year that the Federal Court, Trial Division
did not have jurisdiction to judicially review decisions of the Pension Appeals
Board (PAB). In Mosher v. Canada,180 the court reversed a Trial Division
decision which had dismissed an application to strike the applicant's claim for an
order in the nature of certiorari to set aside a PAB decision. 18 1 The court held that
"it is beyond debate that the Pension Appeals Board is required to act in a judicial
manner", and that therefore the Federal Court of Appeal had exclusive jurisdiction
to hear applications for judicial review of PAB decisions, by virtue of subsections
28(1) and 28(3) of the Federal Court Act, as they then read. 182 This ruling
effectively deprived the applicant of the opportunity to have the PAB decision
judicially reviewed, since section 28(6) of the FCA, as it then read, specifically
precluded proceedings before the FCA in respect of decisions of the PAB. The
179. "Pensioners to keep overpayments", The Globe and Mail (25 April 1994) A7.
180. [1994] F.C.J. No. 948 (F.C.A.) [unreported]; rev'g (1993), 62 F.T.R. 50 (F.C.T.D.).
181. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Mosher (1990), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8616. In
that case, the PAB had found that the requirement that a common law spouse have
resided with a deceased contributor for one year before his or her death in order to be
eligible for a survivor's pension did not violate section 15 of the Charter See Review
1993 at 42-43.
182. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, hereinafter the FCA. Section 28(1) provided that the Court of
Appeal had jurisdiction to hear an application to review a decision made by a federal
board "other than a decision or order of an administrative nature not required by law to
be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis". Section 28(3) provided that:
Where the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction under this section to hear and
determine an application to review and set aside a decision or order, the Trial
Division has no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding in respect of that
decision.
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applicant is expected to pursue an appeal of the Mosher decision to the Supreme
Court of Canada, 18 3 and that could produce some welcome jurisprudence as to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. It must be noted, however, that, as a result of
recent amendments to the FCA, the Federal Court of Appeal now has express
jurisdiction to judicially review decisions of the PAB. 184 The jurisdiction of the
Federal Court, Trial Division under section 18 of the FCA would now appear to be
limited to judicial review of determinations which are not subject to appeal.
(ii) Survivor's benefits - Charter challenges
An application for judicial review, now pending before the Federal Court of
Appeal in a case involving survivor's benefits, promises to raise some interest-
ing Charter issues. In Storto v. The Minister of National Health and Welfare,185
the deceased contributor had become disabled in 1969 but was ineligible for a
CPP disability pension at that time because of insufficient contributions. He
began receiving a retirement pension in 1988. His widow was denied survivor's
and death benefits because the contributor had insufficient contributions during
his contributory period, which ran from 1966 to 1988. The PAB held that the
entire period from 1969 to 1988 could be excluded from the contributory period
as months during which the contributor was disabled, under the disability
dropout provisions in section 49(c) of the Plan. 186 On this basis, the contributory
requirements for survivor's benefits were met. The federal Attorney General has
applied for judicial review of the PAB decision. 187 One of the arguments which
is expected to be made on behalf of the contributor's widow is that to deny her
benefits would constitute discrimination on the basis of disability under section
15 of the Charter. While previous section 15 challenges to disability pension
provisions in the Plan have focussed on the differing eligibility requirements
for disability pensions (and have been, to date, unsuccessful 188), this case could
shift the focus of argument to the underlying right of disabled persons to make
contributions to the Plan.
There was another equality rights challenge to the provisions governing eligi-
bility for survivor's benefits this past year. In McLeod v Canada,]89 the Alberta
183. Conversation with office of Mr. Alan Germain, counsel for the applicant, July 25, 1994.
184. Amendments made by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 8, proclaimed in force February 1, 1992.
185. (30 December 1993), Appeal: CP 2690 (Pension Appeals Board) [unreported].
186. An identical disability dropout provision is contained in section 44(2)(b)(iii) of the
Plan.
187. The Attorney General of Canada v. Storto, Application No. A-54-94 (F.C.A.).
188. See Review 1993 at 43.
189. [1994] 4 W.W.R. 293 (Alta. Q.B.). See the discussion of this case below, under D. The
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Court of Queen's Bench held that the denial of benefits to a legal spouse where
the deceased contributor was living in a conjugal relationship with another
person at the time of his death did not violate section 15 of the Charter.
(iii) Pension credit splitting
A Charter challenge to the provisions governing the splitting of pension credits
between divorced spouses was struck out this past year before it reached trial.
In Murray v. Canada (Minister of Health and Welfare), 190 the plaintiff, who had
been divorced in 1974, sought a division of her former spouse's pension credits.
Her application had been denied on the grounds that the pension splitting
provisions applied only to spouses who had divorced on or after January 1, 1978.
The plaintiff argued that this constituted discrimination on the basis of marital
status, age and sex. The Federal Court, Trial Division dismissed the discrimina-
tion claim on the basis that it would require a retrospective application of the
Charter.
(iv) Late application rule
The convoluted "late application" rule in section 44(1)(b)(iv) of the Plan
continues to cause confusion. Section 44(1)(b)(iv) provides that a disability pension
is payable to:
...a contributor to whom a disability pension would have been payable at the
time the contributor is deemed to have become disabled had an application for a
disability pension been received prior to the time the contributor's application
for a disability pension was actually received. 19 1
The PAB has not yet directly considered the application of this provision.
However, it has indirectly approved of the ministerial practice of determining
eligibility under section 44(l)(b)(iv) by deciding when an applicant last met
contribution requirements and then deciding whether he or she was disabled on
that date. 192 In Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Petrollini,193 the
applicant had applied for disability benefits in August of 1991, before section
44(1)(b)(iv) came into effect. The Minister had rejected her application on the basis
that she was one year short of contributions, and a Review Tribunal had reversed
that decision. The PAB held that she was not eligible but on the grounds that she
Constitution, Human Rights and Poverty Law.
190. [1993] F.C.J. No. 1176 (F.C.T.D.) [unreported].
191. Section 44(l)(b)(iv) came into effect on June 26, 1992. For a discussion of this amend-
ment see Review 1992 at 36-37.
192. Last year, we argued that this approach was inconsistent with the wording of the section
and did not always produce the best result for the applicant; see Review 1993 at 40-41.
193. (1993), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8517.
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was not disabled, not on the issue of sufficiency of contributions. Significantly,
however, the PAB prefaced its discussion of the disability issue with the
following summary of how section 44(l)(b)(iv) might impact on the applicant's
eligibility:
Applying the retrospective effect of [section 44(l)(b)(iv)], the applicant could have
satisfied the minimum qualifying period had she made an application earlier in time,
such as in March 1991. Going back 15 months from this notional date of application
[section 42(2)(b)] fixes December 1989 as the earliest possible onset date, if the
Respondent is to qualify from a contributory period stand point [sic]. Counsel for
the Minister informed the Board that it was ministerial policy to apply Section
44(1)(b)(iv) to all applications not yet finally determined, where disqualification
arose by reason only of untimely application. Hence, the application of said Section
44(1)(b)(iv) is not in question on this appeal. 194
(v) Chronic pain
Last year we reported on three PAB decisions recognizing that persons suffering
from chronic pain may be eligible for CPP disability benefits. 195 The PAB has
since released two more decisions on chronic pain, which confirm that the key
hurdle in establishing a chronic pain disability is proving that the disability is
"severe". In Burns v. Minister of National Health and Welfare,196 the PAB stated
that, while chronic pain syndrome can justify entitlement, it "does however
involve a very heavy onus on a pension applicant to establish that entitle-
ment". 197 In Bums, the PAB found that the applicant could not meet that onus.
A significant fact, in the eyes of the Board, was that there was no indication of
any mental depression or any other psychological problems. By contrast, in
Bennett v. Minister of National Health and Welfare, 198 the PAB did find that a
chronic pain sufferer was entitled to disability benefits. However, the applicant
in that case also had a learning disability, and the Board clearly based its decision
on the cumulative effect of the two disabilities. It is evident that the PAB is
reluctant to base a finding of disability on chronic pain alone.
194. Ibid. at 5986.
195. See Review 1993 at 43-44.
196. (1993), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8522.
197. Ibid. at 5993.
198. (1993), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8520.
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C. DEVELOPMENTS IN HOUSING LAW
(a) Legislative Developments
(i) Bill 115
The first piece of legislation to pass which affected residential tenancies was Bill
115, the Revised Statutes Confirmation and Corrections Act. 199 This was a
house-keeping Bill intended to fix clerical or unintended mistakes made in
the revision of statutes for the 1990 consolidation of Ontario statutes.
The R.S.O. 1990 consolidation removed references in the Landlord and Tenant
Act 200 to "summary application" and also deleted the direction that proceedings
are to be heard in the "county or district in which the premises are located". 20 1
Bill 115 amends s.114(1), of the LTA by reinserting a reference to the "county
or district in which the premises are located". The Bill also adds a new s. 117.1
to Part IV which states:
117.1(1) An application under this Part shall be made, heard and determined in
the county or district in which the premises are located.
(2) An application under this Part shall be heard and determined in a summary
way.
Bill 115 also amends s. 129202 of the LTA to delete the reference to the
Residential Tenancies Act 20 3 and to add a reference to the Residential Rent
Regulation Act204 and restores a deletion of the reference to a judge in s.
97(1)(d)(ii) of the LTA. The latter correction makes the provision consistent with
the R.S.O. 1980 consolidation, as amended.
(ii) Bill 120 - Residents'Rights Act, 1994205
Perhaps the main piece of legislation affecting residential tenancies can be
considered the Residents'Rights Act, 1994. This was really a combination of
199. S.O. 1993, c. 27. The Bill received Royal Assent on December 2, 1993. The Bill is ret-
roactively in force as of December 1991.
200. R.S.O. 1990, c. L-7 as amended. Hereinafter the LTA.
201. This problem was addressed hastily through a revision to Rule 38, 0. Reg. 175/92.
202. This section deals with the notice of rent increase requirements under the LTA.
203. R.S.O. 1980, c. 452, repealed in part.
204. R.S.O. 1990, c. R-29, hereinafter the RRRA, (now repealed). Pursuant to s. 15(b) of the
Interpretation Act R.S.O. 1990, c. I-11, the reference to the RRRA may be construed as
being a reference to the Rent Control Act, S.O. 1992. c. 11, hereinafter the RCA.
205. S.O. 1994, c. 2. The Bill received Royal Assent on May 31, 1994.
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two legislative initiatives. One of these dealt with the issue of "garden
suites" (or "granny flats") and illegal basement apartments. 206 The other
dealt with the separate issue of residents in unregulated "care homes".
20 7
As enacted, the new legislation extends coverage of the RCA and the LTA to
residents living in residential premises where they receive care, whether or
not the receiving of care is the primary purpose of occupancy.208 There is a
limited exemption for premises which provide short-term rehabilitation or
therapy.20 9 Further, there is an exemption from the definition of rent of
charges for "care services or meals". 210 The legislation also makes it legal
206. The part of the legislation dealing with apartments in houses and garden suites was pro-
claimed in force as of July 3, 1994.
Legislation in the form of amendments to the Planning Act and the Municipal Act
was first introduced in October 29, 1992, in Bill 90. The legislation was not proceeded
with. Some courts had taken the position that units which violate zoning by-laws or the
Planning Act were not governed by the LTA. Others took the position that landlord's
could evict tenants under the "illegal act" provisions of the LTA (s. 107(l)(b)). The law
on whether the violation of zoning by-laws is sufficient to constitute an "illegal act" is
far from settled, however.
There is also a statutory interpretation argument which can be made with respect to the
scope of termination for an "illegal act". It is a principle of interpretation that provisions in a
statute are not to be given an interpretation that renders them superfluous. It can be expressed
also as: general provisions can be limited in scope by specific provisions. If the "illegal act"
provision is read to include zoning by-laws and other housing standard laws, then the provi-
sion in s. 107(1 )(e) for overcrowding would have been legislated for no purpose.
207. The care home provisions of Bill 120 were proclaimed in force August 22, 1994. Bill
120 was the result of the report arising from a government inquiry into unregulated resi-
dential housing: E.S. Lightman, "A Community of Interests: The Report of the Com-
mission of Inquiry into Unregulated Residential Accommodation" (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1992). The Commission was formed as a result of the death of a resident in an
unregulated boarding home. The 330 page report recommended among other things that
the Landlord and Tenant Act and the Rent Control Act be applicable to residential
premises providing care to vulnerable adults. Prior to the enactment of Bill 120 the LTA
and the RCA contained an exemption for residential premises "for penal, correctional,
rehabilitative or therapeutic purposes, of for the purpose of receiving care".
208. Previously, there was conflicting jurisprudence as to whether the "rehabilitation, ther-
apy, and care" exemptions applied only when these were a "primary purpose" or
whether they needed only to be "a purpose". The Divisional Court held that the RRRA
(now superseded by the RCA) applied to premises were the provision of care was not a
primary purpose: Re Tenants of the Grenadier And We-Care Retirement Homes (1993),
63 .O.A.C 387 (Div. Ct.). The relevant exemption provision is worded similarly to the
LTA provision. In Keith Whitney Homes Society v Payne (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 186
(O.C.J.), the Court held that all that was required under the parallel LTA provision was
that the provision of care be a purpose. Both of these decisions are presently under
appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal.
209. Usually a maximum of six months, although a lesser period may be specified by regula-
tion.
210. This will be subject to regulation under the RCA. The Divisional Court had held that
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for homes to have more than one unit, including basement apartments and
garden suites. This has removed the uncertainty concerning whether tenants in
such units were to be given the full protection of the LTA and the RCA.
2 11
(iii) Bill 21 - Land Lease Statute Law Amendment Act, 1994212
Another major housing reform was Bill 21, the Land Lease Statute Law Amend-
ment Act, 1994. While this was a private members bill, the legislation as
amended appeared to have the full and active support of the Minister of Housing.
The Bill as originally introduced contained major flaws and it was quietly and
significantly amended even before the public hearings commenced. 2 13 The
legislation extended the protection of the LTA to land lease community
homes. 2
14
Bill 21 also amended the Planning Act 2 15 and the Rental Housing Protection
Act 2 16 to extend protection of the latter Act to mobile home parks and land lease
communities in municipally unorganized territories. The changes validated
existing use as a mobile home park or land lease community at the date of the
enactment of the Bill and will help to prevent wholesale conversion of these
complexes to a use other than residential rental accommodation. The conversion
meals were included in rent in Re Tenants of the Grenadier, supra, note 208. The
exclusion of meals was strongly resisted by tenant advocates who felt this took away
existing benefits from the tenants. For example, s. 121(4) contemplates that the provi-
sion of food may be considered a vital service and a contractual obligation of the land-
lord under some tenancy agreements. Accordingly, it would have been included in the
pre-Bill 121 definition of "rent".
211. The legislation has not entirely solved the problem of uncertainty surrounding tenancies
which may contravene zoning or planning laws. There are other zoning and planning
violations which may occur in relation to residential units.
212. S.O. 1994, c. 4. This Bill received Royal Assent on June 23, 1994 and came into force
on that date.
213. The Bill created special rights for a sub-class of mobile home park which was a year-
round mobile home park. The original Bill did not extend protection to mobile home
parks and land lease communities outside areas of municipal organization. This denied
the benefit of the legislation to a large number of tenants in Northern Ontario. There
was also a problematic provision requiring the creation of a reserve fund. All of these
aspects of the Bill were eventually dropped from the legislation.
214. A "land lease community home" is a structure which is fixed permanently to the land
but where the owner of the home leases the land. Usually these are modular homes. The
definition does not include a mobile home. The existing definitions of "residential
premises" and "residential complex" in the RCA was already broad enough to include
these homes under the scope of that Act.
215. R.S.O. 1990, c. P-13
216. R.S.O. 1990, c. R-24
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of this land to other uses would result in a massive reduction in the supply of
affordable housing.
217
(iv) Bill 104 - Municipal Amendment Act, (Vital Services), 1994.218
This legislation permits municipalities to pass by-laws requiring landlords
to provide vital services and prohibiting suppliers from cutting off vital
services to tenants when a landlord fails to pay his or her account. 2 19 If a
landlord who is required to provide such services does not do so, then
municipality may take steps to arrange for the continued provision of the
service.
(v) Bill 20 - The Tenants and Landlords Protection Act, 1993220
One disturbing piece of private member's legislation was Bill 20. The Bill
provided for the eviction of tenants convicted of certain narcotics offenses. This
was to be part of the criminal proceedings against the accused tenant.
The Bill was disturbing for a number of different reasons, not the least of which
was the moral righteousness with which several members of all parties defended
it. The Bill was unnecessary given the existing provisions of the LTA.
2 2 1
Moreover, it is more than likely unconstitutional as it purported to give the
power of eviction to a provincial court judge 22 2 and to effect a form of double
217. The courts had already ruled that landlords could convert these premises to other uses,
including vacant use; see Re Cove Mobilehome Park & Sales Ltd. and Welch (1979), 27
O.R. (2d) 65 (Div. Ct.) and Re Kingsway Villa Ltd. and Ethier, [1992] O.J. No. 632
(O.C.J.) [unreported].
218. S.O. 1994, c. 7.
219. Special legislation was already in existence permitting the municipalities of London,
Toronto, and Ottawa to exercise these powers.
220. Bill 20 was introduced by Mr. Runciman (PC, Leeds-Grenville) on May 18, 1993.
221. Section 107(l)(b) permits a landlord to seek early termination of a tenancy where the
tenant has committed an illegal act on the premises. An illegal act which does not affect
the nature of the premises or the interests of other tenants does not, and should not, give
rise to cause for early termination of a tenancy. Under s. 107, the landlord need only
establish on the balance of probabilities that the tenant committed the impugned act. It
is not necessary that the tenant have been convicted on a charge relating to the act.
Under the LTA a landlord can proceed with an application on this ground after 20 days
from the date on which notice of termination is given whether or not the tenant has been
charged or convicted. As such, there is no effective purpose to Bill 20 other than to sat-
isfy mean-spirited legislators.
222. As such it is contrary to the Supreme Court of Canada ruling in Reference re Residen-
tial Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714. The Supreme Court struck down provis-
ions of that Act which purported to give the powers of eviction to a provincially
appointed administrative tribunal.
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punishment. The Bill passed second reading but did not proceed further before
the end of the provincial legislative session on June 23, 1994.
(b) Litigation Developments
(i) Res Judicata in Rent Review Proceedings
The Ontario Court of Appeal released an extremely important decision in Re
Rent Review Hearings Board and Prajs.2 23 The decision appears to have cleared
up the misunderstanding over rent review procedures and jurisdiction and their
implications for the principle of res judicata in subsequent proceedings. The
courts have generally not taken care to understand the fine distinctions in the
remedies available in the different types of rent review and landlord and tenant
applications.
224
In RRHB and Prajs the landlord had filed a whole building rent review applica-
tion under section 74 of the RRRA, in October, 1987. Over the course of the next
two years the landlord had served notices of rent increase on the tenants and had
entered into yearly lease renewal agreements at the same time as the proposed
rent increases were to take effect. However, the lease agreements specified that
the rent payable during the lease term was to be at a rate which was less than
the proposed new maximum rent.
During the second renewal period, an Order of the Minister issued under s. 83(1)
of the RRRA and set the new maximum rent. The new rent was to be effective
February 1, 1988. The landlord demanded a lump sum payment of the back rent
due from the tenants, which was based upon the difference between the rent
actually paid and the maximum rent allowed under the Order. The dispute
eventually ended up before the Court of Appeal.
In the decision under appeal, the Divisional Court had relied on an earlier
decision Re Prajs and Booty.225 In that earlier case another tenant from the same
building had been granted an order against the same landlord for the return of
excess rent. The Divisional Court had set aside the order on the grounds of the
perceived bias of the administrator, and also declared that the tenant was barred
from bringing the s. 95 rebate application because the landlord's whole building
review application (and the Minister's subsequent order) had rendered the issue
res judicata.
223. (1993), 16 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.). Hereinafter RRHB and Prajis.
224. For example see Re Prajs and Booty (1992), 55 O.A.C. 359 (Div. Ct.).
225. Ibid.
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In RRHB and Prajs the Divisional Court held that Re Prajs and Booty had
determined the matter and that the issue was therefore res judicata.
On the appeal of RRHB and Prajs the Court of Appeal held that the Divisional
Court erred in its interpretation of s. 83 [maximum rent orders] and s. 95 [rebate
applications]. 226 Section 83 was held to be permissive, allowing the Minister to
set the maximum rent that may be charged and when that maximum rent may
take effect. The Court stated that the section could never operate where the
parties have agreed to a lesser rent.2 27 Further, the facts under consideration in
s. 74 applications and s. 95 applications were not the same. Therefore the
Divisional Court's conclusion that the matter in Re Praj and Booty was res
judicata was incorrect. The Court of Appeal stated that the Divisional Court
should have considered the merits of the case in RRHB and Prajs.
228
In considering the merits, the Court of Appeal held that the RRRA permitted a
catch-up payment of rent where rent lower than the "maximum rent" had been
charged. However the Act in no way purported to limit the right of the parties
to enter into a binding agreement setting a rent lower than that permitted. 229 The
landlord's right to "catch-up" is "subject to the appropriate notice having been
given, and can be abrogated by an intervening agreement between the par-
ties". 2 3
0
(ii) Repair and Maintenance Obligations
In Mortimer v Cameron23 1 the plaintiff attended a party at the apartment of a
class mate, Hunt. The apartment was on the second floor of a home owned by
Stingray Investments. The plaintiff was engaged in some friendly horseplay with
another classmate, Cameron. The plaintiff tripped over the raised threshold to
the apartment, pulled Cameron towards him and together they tumbled onto an
exterior landing, through its exterior wall and plunged to the ground 10 feet
below.
226. Supra, note 223 at 101.
227. Ibid. at 102.
228. Ibid. at 103. The result of this case and its overruling of Re Prajs and Booty produces a
fair interpretation of the statute. Otherwise, any tenant with a lease for rent which is less
than the maximum rent would be required to go to Court to seek recovery of rent paid
in excess of that set out in the lease and this would undermine the process for summary
resolution of rent related disputes under the RRRA.
229. Ibid. at 99.
230. Ibid. at 100.
231. (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) I (C.A.).
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The injuries sustained by the plaintiff rendered him a complete quadriplegic. An
action was commenced against Cameron, Hunt, Stingray and the City of Lon-
don.232 The Court of Appeal held that while there was no requirement that the
city enact by-laws with respect to the inspection of residential premises for
compliance with building standards, once the city had done so there was a duty
to use due care in giving effect to them.
233
The Court held that incidental third party users who are injured on private
property are a class of persons to whom a duty is owed by the city.234 The fact
that the tenant and the plaintiff were engaged in horseplay did not render the use
of the premises "so unreasonable or rare or unexpected as to fall outside the
reasonable contemplation of the city". 235 The structure did not comply with the
building code and it did not comply with its intended purpose to prevent
accidental falls.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had correctly determined that the
landlord, as owner and occupier of the premises, was under an ongoing duty to
inspect the enclosed exterior stairway irrespective of any notification from its
tenants of any problem relating thereto. 236 The landlord has the primary burden
of repair and responsibility for maintaining the premises.
The case is very significant to LTA proceedings for a couple of reasons. It finds
that a landlord has the ongoing duty to inspect and that the liability is imposed
regardless of an absence of prior notification of a problem by a tenant. This
colours earlier Court of Appeal jurisprudence about liability for latent and patent
defects. If there is an ongoing duty to inspect and that duty is as high as is
imposed here, then rarely would a defect be truly latent. Further, the potential
232. The plaintiff advanced numerous grounds of liability including negligence, assault, bat-
tery, trespass, violations of the Building Code and breach of the provisions of the
Occupiers' Liability Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 322, (now R.S.O. 1990, c. 0-2), hereinafter
the Occupiers' Liability Act. As well, the plaintiff maintained that there was an inde-
pendent cause of action against Stingray for breach of its statutory duty under what is
now s. 94 of the LTA.
233. Supra, note 231 at 8-9.
234. Ibid. at 10-11. The duty of care is "a duty to exercise reasonable care both in inspecting
the plans which were submitted for the proposed enclosure of the exterior stairway ...
and in inspecting the construction authorized by the building permit" (at 8).
235. Ibid. at 10.
236. Ibid. at 12. The inspection must be a "reasonable inspection". The structure had deterio-
rated and should have warned a reasonable occupier of the need to retain a knowledge-
able person to assess the soundness of the entire structure. The failure to have the
structure properly inspected was an actionable breach of s. 3(1) of the Occupiers' Lia-
bility Act.
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liability of a municipality for negligent inspection or enforcement of by-laws
relating to housing standards, may be used to encourage more active participa-
tion by municipalities in patrolling standards complaints.
The Court of Appeal does not comment expressly on the trial judge's partial
reliance on what is now s. 94 of the LTA. However, the finding of an ongoing
duty to inspect and maintain premises is based on the trial judge's reliance on
s. 94. So too is the finding that no notification is required. While the decision
seems to be based on the Occupiers' Liability Act, there is no reason the
principles would not apply to s. 94 repairs applications.
(iii) Arrears Payments
A third Court of Appeal decision of note is Re Malva Enterprises Inc. and
Rosgate Holdings.237 This involved a commercial tenancy proceeding under the
LTA. The tenant had been in arrears and the landlord had proceeded in court and
obtained a judgment for the arrears. The landlord continued to treat the lease as
subsisting and the tenant paid the current rent as due. The landlord appropriated
this money toward the arrears and considered that the tenant was in arrears for
the current month's rental payments. The landlord proceeded for forfeiture of
the lease.
The Court of Appeal held that the application of rental payments may be
controlled by the direction of the tenant or the contract or the custom of the
parties. The landlord had elected to allow the lease to continue by continuing to
claim the rent falling due. A breach of the covenant to pay rent is not a continuing
breach. The landlord did not have an "ever-recurring new right of election" to
forfeit the lease for the past breaches. 23
8
The same principle should apply in residential tenancy situations where the
tenant owes a security deposit which had been used up to pay arrears. Frequently
landlords argue that they have a right to apply current rent to the deposit. This
means that the tenant remains in arrears and that the landlord allegedly has the
right to seek termination based on arrears of the current month's rent. The tenant
ought to be able to direct that current payments go to current rent rather than to
reimburse the deposit. This decision supports that conclusion. 239
237. (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 167 (Ont. C.A.).
238. Ibid. at 176-8.
239. Arguably, the principle of res judicata should estop the landlord from claiming forfei-
ture for the same arrears to which it had obtained judgement. The Court does not
address this principle.
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(iv) Res Judicata and Summary Judgments
Two other decisions deserving of particular attention are MacPherson v Sing 240
and Shaw v Kelly.24 1 These were both motions for summary judgment under
Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure242 based on Residential Rent Hearings
Board (the RRHB) determinations as to excess rent which were above the
monetary jurisdiction under the Residential Rent Regulation Act. These conflict-
ing cases also deal with the issue of res judicata and the interplay between
different residential tenancy related proceedings.
In MacPherson v Sing, the tenant obtained an order from the RRHB that her
maximum rent was $721. Excess rent was owing in the amount of $24,000 but
the tenant did not waive the amount over the then $3,000 limit of the RRHB
jurisdiction. The tenant commenced a claim in court for the full amount and
brought a motion for summary judgment in reliance on the order of the RRHB.
On the motion, the master held that the court could not accept the order of the
Board as "sacrosanct and conclusive" when nothing in the Act permitted the
court to accept the Board's decision as proof of the claim.
In Shaw v Kelly, the court expressly disagreed with the master's reasons in
MacPherson. The matters of maximum rent, rent paid by the tenant, and excess
rent which were determined by the Minister were held to be resjudicata.24 3
Another issue raised in the Shaw v Kelly proceeding was whether the limitation
period had expired on those parts of the excess rent paid more than six years
previously. The Court held it had not expired. The cause of action did not arise
(and the limitation period did not begin) until the final determination of the
appropriate rent and the amount of the overpayment. The tenant, having con-
tractually agreed to pay the rent actually paid, was not entitled to claim for the
overpayment until it had been determined that such an overpayment had been
made.
2 4 4
240. [1993] O.J. No. 2330 (O.C.J.) [unreported].
241. (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 255 (O.C.J.). The tenant was represented by the Kingston Com-
munity Legal Clinic.
242. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as amended.
243. Supra, note 241 at 257. The only triable issue would have been whether or not some of
the monies had been re-paid by the landlord but that issue was not raised in the pro-
ceedings before the Court.
244. Ibid. at 58. While the result with respect to the limitation period issue benefitted the ten-
ant, it is questionable whether this is indeed correct for all purposes. It should be correct
with respect to the proceeding to court under rent review. However, it may not be cor-
rect in the context of civil proceedings for restitution of illegal rents. The analysis of
this issue is complex. Under the LTA, tenants cannot contract out of their rights under
(1994) 10 Journal of Law and Social Policy
(v) Abatements
The courts have treated abatement claims very inconsistently. In some cases the
courts have seemed to view them more as in the nature of damages in tort, with
the requirement of negligence or at least due diligence. However, the Divisional
Court in Re Offredi and 75168 Ontario Ltd.245 has held that the remedy of
abatement is a contractual remedy for reduced rent during any time period in
which the tenant receives less than they were entitled to. This decision should
clarify that a tenancy is a contractual agreement subject to contractual principles.
This was one s. 94 abatement application brought by many tenants in an
apartment complex. The Divisional Court held that the fact that the landlord had
acted reasonably was irrelevant in a contractual claim. Further, the fact that the
interference with the tenants' enjoyment of the premises was caused by under-
taking repairs that were necessary to maintain the structural integrity of the
building was irrelevant. The s. 94 obligation was the landlord's burden and not
the tenants'. The obligation to maintain the premises in accordance with building
standards did not diminish the contractual obligation to give the tenants what
they had bargained for; quiet enjoyment and premises that were in a good state
of repair.
(vi) Costs in Landlord and Tenant Proceedings
One final decision of note is Re Lacey and Shaughnessy Brothers Investments
Ltd.24 6 The issue in that case concerned costs in landlord and tenant proceedings.
the Act, and any agreement that does is void. The RRRA and RCA contain similar pro-
visions in s.2 of both Acts. If payment of legal rent is a right under Part IV, and the
RCA, then the contractual provision is void and not binding on the tenant, contrary to
the determination of Rosenberg, J. It is not clear that "rent' under Part IV is tied to
"rent" under the RCA except in the context of rent review/control. Indeed, the Court in
Re Black and Martineau (14 September 1994), Cobourg #3741/94 (O.C.J.) [unre-
ported], expressly chose to side-step that issue. Nevertheless, section 129 of the LTA
deals with rent increases and that section cross-references the rent control legislation.
We suggest that "rent" under the LTA is necessarily tied to "rent' under the RCA/RRRA
by this section. Both the rent control legislation and the LTA provide that where notice
is improper, the notice of increase is "void". One would think that where a notice of
increase is void and any increase is therefore illegal, that the contract term is void for
illegality. It is void ab initio (i.e., from the beginning). There is disagreement on this
point. It is suggested that all the rent review process does is determine the existence of
that fact (that rent was overpaid)-it doesn't create the existence of the fact.
245. [1994] O.J. No. 1204 (Div. Ct.) [unreported]; aff'g (1991), 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1051
(O.C.J.) [unreported]
246. (13 October 1993), Peterborough #9001/93 (O.C.J.) [unreported]. The tenants in this
case were represented by the Peterborough Community Legal Centre. This was a
mobile home park repairs case under the LTA. The case also has important substantive
worth, as the court ordered 100% abatement despite the fact that tenants had some
minor services provided. Another significant mobile home park abatement case was Re
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At the end of the proceedings the Court addressed the issues of costs. Counsel for
the tenants had asked for $500 costs but had not otherwise addressed her mind to
the issue. The Court felt that $500 was too low and awarded $1500 costs. 247 The
Court stated that the next time counsel came to court she should have figures with
respect to the number of hours spent on preparation and concerning any disburse-
ments. A "guesstimate" was not good enough. The Court pointed to a "new rule"
with respect to costs and indicated that it was quite clear that both counsel
overlooked this rule and should not do so in the future.
248
D. THE CONSTITUTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POVERTY LAW
1. Charter Jurisprudence - General Developments
(a) Section 15249 - Enumerated Grounds of Discrimination
(i) Age and Disability
Charter challenges to tax legislation continued this year. In Kasvand v
MNR, 250 the unrepresented taxpayer's income consisted entirely of CPP,
other pension and superannuation payments, family allowance, and interest and
investment income. Her RRSP deductions were disallowed, based on the defi-
nition of "earned income" contained in the Income Tax Act. She challenged the
disallowance, arguing that, in excluding these types of income from the defini-
Plachta and Minnie (23 June 1994) Cobourg (O.C.J.) [unreported]. The tenants were
successful in obtaining significant abatement for disrepair. However, the landlord has
appealed this decision. The tenants are represented by the Northumberland Community
Legal Centre.
247. The Court ordered solicitor-client costs against the landlord as it indicated the litigation
was unnecessary and also awarded punitive damages for the flagrant disregard by the
landlord for the rights of the tenants.
248. It is to be hoped that this decision does not reflect a trend.The new "rules" referred to
are new practice directions in the Central East Region of Ontario. These establish new
guidelines for costs in motions and applications. The costs are quite high and could
have the practical effect of rendering LTA proceedings "un-summary" and out of the
reach of most tenants. It is possible that these Practice Directions never contemplated
summary proceedings under the LTA or other statutes. Landlord and tenant proceedings
are more akin to small claims actions which are also summary in nature and have the
same evidentiary requirements. Costs in Small Claims Court are considerably lower
than those in regular civil proceedings.
249. Section 15(1) provides:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.
250. (1994), 167 N.R. 63 (F.C.A.).
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tion of "earned income", the Income Tax Act discriminated on the grounds of
age and disability. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the argument in one
short paragraph, evading the issue by holding that the distinction at issue was
not on the basis of age or disability but on source of income. The Federal Court
of Appeal avoided serious consideration of the possibility that differentiating
on the ground of the categories of income at issue might constitute constructive,
or "adverse effect" discrimination on the ground of age or disability and so
offend s.15, absent a valid s.1 defence. 2
5 1
(b) Section 15 - Unenumerated Grounds of Discrimination
(i) Poverty
In last year's article, we reviewed the decision in Sparks v DartmouthlHalifax
County Regional Housing Authority,252 in which the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal recognized that single mothers who were subsidised housing tenants
formed an identifiable group in society, characterized by, among other factors,
poverty. The court therefore found that such tenants were an unenumerated
group for the purpose of s. 15 of the Charter.
As mentioned above, in R v Rehberg,25 3 the Nova Scotia Supreme Court
extended the Sparks reasoning and expressly found that poverty was analogous
to the grounds enumerated in section 15. The court went on to find that the
"man-in-the-house" rule in Nova Scotia social assistance legislation violated
section 15 as it discriminated against single mothers on family benefits, a group
characterized by both poverty and sex.
There are two applications pending in the Ontario Court (General Division) in
which s. 15 has been invoked to protect vulnerable tenants. The first is Batten
et al v Community Lifecare et al (Rubidge Hall Retirement Home). 254 This is an
application under Rule 14.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for an injunction
prohibiting the eviction of tenants and for a declaration concerning their rights.
251. This approach provides a sharp contrast to the decision of the same court in Thibaudeau
v Canada (MNR) (1994), 167 N.R. 161 (F.C.A.) and to the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Symes v. MNR (1993), 161 N.R. 243 (S.C.C.). The latter case poses
a particular contrast, since the Federal Court of Appeal acknowledged a nexus in
Kasvand, as the Supreme Court did not in Symes, between the type of payment at issue
and the ground of discrimination claimed. Thus, there is a clear possibility that the
Supreme Court of Canada would have decided Kasvand differently.
252. (1992), 112 N.S.R. (2d) 389, (Co. Ct.); rev'd (1993), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 224 (N.S.C.A.).
For a discussion of this case see Review 1993 at 52-53.
253. Supra, note 25.
254. Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. File No. 9780/93. The tenants are represented by the Peterborough
Community Legal Centre.
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The applicants are people with psychiatric or developmental disabilities, whom
their landlord was seeking to evict. There is at present an interim injunction in
force. The continuation of the action is in some doubt, since the passage of
Residents'Rights Act, 1994 has provided some legislative response to the plight
of the tenants.
255
The second application is Clarke and Baker v Peterborough Utilities Commis-
sion et al.2 56 The applicants are social assistance recipients who are required to
pay substantial deposits before utilities will be provided for them. At issue is
whether the utilities' deposit policy, which provides that deposits will be
required from "residential tenants who cannot demonstrate satisfactory payment
histories or otherwise reasonably ensure payment of future charges", infringes
sections 7 or 15 of the Charter or the authorizing statute, which provides for
"reasonable" deposits. Also at issue is whether the absence of the ground of
receipt of social assistance from s. 1 of the Human Rights Code offends s. 15 of
the Charter.
(ii) Marital/Family Status
In Schachtschneider v Minister of National Revenue,2 57 the majority of the
Federal Court of Appeal found that a tax provision which was disadvantageous
to the applicant because she was married and living with her spouse did not
discriminate because of marital status. Mahoney JA, for the majority, stated:
[T]he group now in issue is composed of married persons with a child of the
marriage, living together and not supporting each other. In my opinion, that is
not a group that can be described as being disadvantaged in the context of its
place in the entire social, political and legal fabric of our society. It follows that
it is not a distinct and insular minority within the contemplation of s. 15.258
In Thibaudeau v Canada (MNR), 259 the context dictated a different result. A
divorced mother with custody of her two children challenged the tax treatment
of maintenance payments. Under the current tax laws, maintenance payments
are included in the recipient spouse's income and are deducted from the payor
spouse's income. The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal struck down this
inclusion provision as being discrimination on the basis of "family status". The
255. See the discussion of this Act above, under section C. DEVELOPMENTS IN HOUS-
ING LAW.
256. Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. File Nos. 6605/91 and 6900/91. The applicants are represented by
the Peterborough Community Legal Centre.
257. (1993), 154 N.R. 321 (Fed. C.A.).
258. Ibid., at 329.
259. Supra, note 251.
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court observed that separated custodial parents could readily be seen as "a
discrete and insular minority which has historically suffered prejudice and has
need of protection".
260
(c) Section 15 - Adverse Effect Discrimination
Discrimination is divisible into two types. The first is differentiation according
to membership in a group listed in human rights legislation or covered by s. 15
of the Charter. An example is a rule limiting access to a benefit to persons of
one sex, or imposing a disadvantage upon people younger than a specified age.
The second type of discrimination, most often referred to as "adverse effect"
discrimination, manifests itself by its effect, rather than by differentiation on
prohibited grounds. An example is a requirement by an employer that all
employees work on Saturdays. Such a requirement disadvantages persons
whose religious obligations fall on Saturdays, and thus can constitute religious
discrimination. Adverse effect discrimination has been accepted as part of the
definition of discrimination for the purpose of the Charter,26 1 as well as under
human rights legislation. Adverse effect discrimination is more likely to affect
poor people than direct differentiation on the basis of poverty, and therefore this
jurisprudence is particularly important to poverty law.
2 62
There has been a rather disturbing development in the adverse effect jurispru-
dence under the Charter. The problem is illustrated in the reasoning of the
Federal Court of Appeal in Thibaudeau v. Canada, which in turn is based on
obiter from the judgment of Jacobucci J in Symes v. MNR. 2 63
In Symes, the appellant claimed that the income tax rule that disallowed child
care expenses as a business expense had an adverse effect on women. The
260. Ibid. at 184.
261. The idea that identical treatment can have discriminatory effects was accepted for the
purpose of discrimination analysis under the Charter in Andrews v Law Society of Brit-
ish Columbia [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1. However, to date the only
adverse effect judgements of the Supreme Court in the context of the Charter have been
Symes v. MNR, supra, note 251, and Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General)
(1993), 158 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.).
262. Aside from being a reason for discrimination in itself, poverty is a result of discrimina-
tion. The interrelationship is obvious: discrimination often results in unemployment,
which in turn causes poverty, which in turn engenders more discrimination. Demo-
graphic evidence indicates that women as a group, for example, have lower incomes
than men, and that women are represented among poor people disproportionately to
their presence in the population. Thus discrimination against women can be demon-
strated to have a disproportionate impact on poor people.
263. Supra, note 25 t.
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Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal in a split decision. Mr. Justice
Iacobucci wrote for the majority and his concluding remarks contained some
conjecture about how a similar s.15 challenge might be successful. The aspect
of Symes that was evidently most difficult for the majority was that the appellant
was a member of a "sub-group" of women; the provision in question did not
affect all women. Mr. Justice Iacobucci acknowledged that "an adverse effect
felt by a sub-group of women can still constitute sex-based discrimination".
264
However, he expressed the view that it was possible, and appropriate, to
distinguish between
...being able to point to individuals negatively affected by a provision, and being
able to prove that a group or sub-group is suffering an adverse effect in law by
virtue of an impugned provision...If a group or sub-group of women could
prove the adverse effect required, the proof would come in comparison with the
relevant body of men. Accordingly, although individual men might be adversely
affected by an impugned provision, those men would not belong to a group or
sub-group of men able to prove the required adverse effect.
...if s.63 creates an adverse effect upon women (or a sub-group) in comparison
with men (or a sub-group), the initial s.15(1) inquiry would be satisfied; a dis-
tinction would have been found based upon the personal characteristic of sex. In
the second s. 15(1) inquiry, however, the sex-based distinction could only be dis-
criminatory with respect to either women or men, not both. The claimant would
have to establish that the distinction had "the effect of imposing a burden, obli-
gation or disadvantage not imposed upon others or of withholding or limiting
access to opportunities, benefits and advantages available to others"...The bur-
den or benefit could not.. .as a logical proposition, fall upon both sexes. Like-
wise, to the extent that a court might undertake a broader search for
"disadvantage that exists apart from and independent of the particular legal dis-
advantage being challenged"...I cannot imagine how such disadvantage could be
located for both men and women at the same time.
265
In Thidaudeau, while the Federal Court of Appeal found the provision of the
Income Tax Act in question to be discriminatory on the basis of "family status",
it dismissed the applicant's claim of sex discrimination. Essentially, they con-
cluded that the presence of even a few men as custodial parents receiving
support, among the much larger pool of women, could foreclose a claim of sex
discrimination. In Hugessen J.A.'s view
"...it surely cannot be the case that legislation that adversely affects both men
and women is discriminatory on the grounds of sex solely because the women
(or men) in question are more numerous...it is not because more women than
men are adversely affected, but rather because some women, no matter how
264. Ibid. at 328.
265. Ibid. at 330-331.
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small the group, are more adversely affected than the equivalent group of men,
that a provision can be said to discriminate on the grounds of sex".
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In essence, what the court is saying is that it is not enough to show that a
disproportionate number of women (as compared to men) suffered an adverse
effect from the legislative provision. In order to succeed in such a case it must
be shown that women are more adversely affected (than men) by the provision.
It is this latter aspect of the judgement that is problematical. There is no authority
for Justice Hugesson's proposition that the focus in deciding that adverse effect
discrimination exists must be confined to the "nature of the effect; on quality
rather than quantity", as opposed to the numbers of the group that are affected.
A view more congruent with the purpose of s. 15 would be that it can exist where
the nature of the effect of an impugned policy is more onerous on women than
on men or where the rule affects women in numbers disproportionate to men.
The decision in Thibaudeau is under appeal. It is to be hoped that the Supreme
Court of Canada will take the opportunity to address the "perceived" problem
raised by the Symes decision. Disproportionality of effect in terms of numbers
was the linchpin of the Supreme Court of Canada's first consideration of adverse
effect discrimination in O 'Malley v Simpson-Sears.267 Clearly, this point needs
to be restated.
2. Social Welfare Programs and the Charter
Last year we discussed the trial court's decision in Conrad v The Municipality
of the County of Halifax,268 in which a welfare recipient claimed that the
termination of her benefits without a hearing constituted a violation of her rights
under section 7 of the Charter. The court denied the claim, holding that the right
to social assistance was a right of an economic nature which was not protected
by section 7. Conrad was appealed without success. 269 The section 7 argument
was not made before the Court of Appeal, and therefore the appeal decision
266. Supra, note 251 at 174-175.
267. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 7 C.H.R.R. D/3102. In fact, in O'Malley, the court stated that
adverse effect discrimination can occur if a rule "affects a person or group of persons
differently from others to whom it may apply" (at D/3106 C.H.R.R., emphasis added).
In Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission)
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, 8 C.H.R.R. D/4210 (the Action Travail case), Justice Dickson
spoke of a rule which "has a disproportionately negative effect on an individual or
group" (at D/4226 C.H.R.R., emphasis added).
268. (1994), 124 N.S.R. (2d) 251 (N.S.S.C). For the discussion of this case see Review 1993
at 55.
269. (April 1994), C.A. No. 02923 (N.S.C.A.) [unreported].
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makes no finding with respect to this issue. The Supreme Court of Canada has
refused leave to appeal on September 15, 1994.
Along with R. v Rehberg, several other decisions considered the impact of
section 15 on social welfare programs. The appeal in Egan and Nesbit v
Canada,27 0 in which the appellants sought a declaration that the definition of
"spouse" contained in the Old Age Security Act 27 1 offends section 15 of the
Charter because it excludes same-sex spouses from spousal benefits, is expected
to be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 1994-95 sittings.
The rules for eligibility for a surviving spouse's pension under the Canada
Pension Plan contain numerous differentiations based on marital status, as well
as other circumstances. The Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Mosher v
Canada2 72 negated one Charter challenge to the definition of "spouse"
contained in the CPP. However, In McLeod v Canada273 the wife of a
deceased person was refused a pension because the couple had not been
cohabiting for eleven years prior to his death. She challenged the refusal
under s. 15, alleging that the CPP definition of "spouse" effects discrimina-
tion on the ground of marital status. The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench
denied the claim for two reasons. The first was that it was the action of her
spouse and another person "which led to the denial to her of survivor's
benefits" 274 rather than her marital status. The second was that marital status
was not a "personal characteristic", because "the actions of two other people
(were) necessary to place one within a particular group". No authority was cited
for this reasoning. It is clearly at odds with the views of the Federal Court of
Appeal in Thibaudeau v. Canada (MNR), and with the obiter of Justice lacobucci
in Symes v. MNR.
3. Developments in Human Rights Law
(a) Same-sex spouses and marital status
In Clinton v Ontario Blue Cross275 the complainant had successfully applied to
have her same-sex partner recognised as a common law spouse for the purposes
of her employment insurance benefits. The Divisional Court overturned the
270. (1993), 153 N.R. 161 (F.C.A.).
271. R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9, as amended.
272. See the discussion above under section B.4 The Canada Pension Plan.
273. [1994] 4 W.W.R. 293 (Alta. Q.B.)
274. Ibid. at 300.
275. (1993), 18 C.H.R.R. D/377. For a discussion of this case see Review 1993 at 56-57.
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decision of the board of inquiry.276 The court's reasoning was that section 25(2)
of the Ontario Human Rights Code provided an exception that allowed the
Ontario government to refuse pension benefits to same-sex spouses.2 77 The
court held that the complainant's only recourse was a Charter challenge to that
provision. Because adequate notice of the Constitutional question had not been
given the Crown, the court did not permit counsel to address the applicability
of s. 15 of the Charter.
(b) Special Programs/Affirmative Action
The Court of Appeal has released an important decision in Ontario Human Rights
Commission v Ontario.27 8 The appellant, Mr. Roberts, had been denied funding for a
prosthetic device under the Ministry of Health's Assistive Devices Program. The
program was limited to those under 23 years of age. Mr. Roberts was 73 years old. A
board of inquiry found that the age restriction did constitute prima facie discrimination
under s. 1 of the Human Rights Code. However, the board held that it was saved by
section 14(1) of the Code which exempted "special programs" from scrutiny under the
Code.2 79 The board held that "special programs" which are protected by s. 14, do not
have to incorporate all disadvantaged groups equally within their terms of reference.
The Divisional Court upheld this decision in a terse ruling. 280 In reversing the
decision of the Divisional Court the majority of the Court of Appeal held that
s. 14 was designed to protect affirmative action programs and had two purposes:
"to assist disadvantaged persons to achieve or attempt to achieve equal oppor-
tunity (reduce disadvantage) and to contribute to the elimination of the infringe-
ment of rights under Part I (eliminate disadvantage)". 28 1 The majority also
276. Ontario Blue Cross v Ontario (Human Rights Commission) [1994] O.J. No. 903, Crt
File No. 543/93 (unreported).
277. Section 25(2) provides:
25(2) The right under section 5 to equal treatment with respect to employment
without discrimination because of age, sex, marital status or family status is not
infringed by an employee superannuation or pension plan or fund or a contract of
group insurance between an insurer and an employer that complies with the
Employment Standards Act and the regulations thereunder.
278. (1994), 190.R. (3d) 387 (C.A.).
279. Section 14 states:
14 (1) A right under Part I is not infringed by the implementation of a special
program designed to relieve hardship or economic disadvantage or to assist
disadvantaged persons or groups to achieve or attempt to achieve equal
opportunity or that is likely to contribute to the elimination of the infringement
of rights under Part I.
280. (1991), 14 C.H.R.R., D/I (Ont. Div. Ct.).
281. Supra, note 278 at 398.
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referred to the "dual purpose" of s. 14 as "protection of affirmative action
programs and promotion of substantive equality".
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The Ministry of Health had argued that, once the criteria of bonafides and design
were met, a special program was protected from any further review under the
Code. The majority held that to promote substantive equality special programs
should be immunized against review on the basis of formal equality, and that
this was the purpose of the provision. However, to interpret the provision as
exempting special programs from review in all circumstances would not be in
accord with the promotion of substantive equality. Thus
... exclusion of an individual from a program designed to respond to needs that
individual does not have, does not constitute reviewable discrimination. This
case does not involve a challenge to the...ADP program by a member from a
historically privileged group or from a disadvantaged person whose disability
the program was not designed to benefit. Consequently, the exemptive purpose
of s. 14(1) is not invoked.
We are concerned in this case with a discriminatory refusal of assistance to a
person with the specific disability that special program was designed to
assist.
2 8 3
The court also rejected the Ministry's argument that special programs implemented
by the Crown are exempt from review, by reason of section 14(5) of the Code.
2 84
The court pointed out that this provision only prevented the Commission from
inquiring into and making a declaratory order in respect of the Crown's special
programs, a process which it may undertake in respect of private sector programs.
There was no prohibition against the Commission appointing a board of inquiry in
respect of a Crown special program.
285
The court also adopted the appellant's argument on the standard of review: that
"there must be a rational connection between the enumerated ground of discrim-
ination and the purpose of a special program in order for the discrimination to
be tolerated". 286 The evidence showed, and the respondent conceded, that there
was no rational connection between the age restriction in the Assistive Devices
Program and the disadvantage the program seeks to alleviate. The Court issued
282. Ibid. at 400.
283. Ibid. at 401.
284. Section 14(5) of the Code provides:
14(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to a special program implemented by the
S Crown or an agency of the Crown.
285. Supra, note 278 at 403-404.
286. Ibid. at 404, 406.
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an order striking out the age restriction, and allowing the matter to be remitted
to the board of inquiry in respect of any other remedies requested. 28
7
(c) Use of the Human Rights Code in Civil Actions
In last year's article, we noted that advocates who are considering a Charter
discrimination argument in a particular poverty law case should also consider
making a discrimination argument under federal or provincial human rights
legislation. Such an argument was successful in Re Mercedes Homes Inc. and
Grace.288 In that case, the Ontario Court (General Division) proceeded with a
landlord and tenant application based on the Code. The tenants had been
harassed by a guest of another tenant because they were gay. They gave notice
of early termination and moved out before the expiry of their lease, and
commenced an application for an abatement. The application was based on a
breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and an express covenant in
the lease. They also based their claim on the landlord's obligations under the
Ontario Human Rights Code. Since the tenants had also filed a complaint under
the Code, there was an application to stay the landlord and tenant action until
the human rights complaint was dealt with. The application was refused, with
the court taking judicial notice that human rights complaints are now subject to
lengthy delays. There court found that there was a breach of both the express
covenant in the lease and of the tenants' rights under the Code. The court also
held that there was no provision in the Landlord and Tenant Act that exempted
that statute from the primacy of the Code.
(d) The Employment Equity Act, 1993289
Although this Act received Royal Assent on 14 December, 1993, it has not yet
been proclaimed.
The Act will impose an obligation on affected employers to do a systematic
review of their employment practices for the purposes specified in the Act. The
purpose of the Act is to promote the representation of qualified aboriginal
people, people with disabilities, members of racial minorities and women in the
workplace to a level that is consistent with their presence in the population of
the geographic area. The focus of the Act is on barrier removal and the
identification of the need for positive measures. The Act will be "phased in" in
a way similar to the schedule that obtained under the Pay Equity Act.
287. Ibid. at 408.
288. [1993] O.J. No. 2610 (O.C.J.) [unreported].
289. S.O. 1993, ch.35
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To date, no employers have been given information on the nature or demograph-
ics of their geographic areas, and therefore they lack essential information
needed to formulate employment equity goals. Once the government has pro-
vided this information, employers will be expected to do the type of survey of
staff composition mandated by the Act, and to compare the results of that survey
to the demographic data for the area. The next steps are a review of employment
systems to identify barriers that currently discourage the employment or pro-
motion of those groups that are underrepresented, and the identification of
positive measures that will make the workforce more representative. A valid
employment equity plan cannot be created without consultation with employees.
The Regulation under the Act, which sets out the definition of geographical areas
and the requirements for how staff surveys, employment systems reviews, and
plan creation are to be done, is still in draft form.
(e) The Ontarians with Disabilities Act
On May 31, 1994, NDP MPP Gary Malkowski tabled Bill 168, the Ontarians
with Disabilities Act, as a Private Member's Bill. The Bill states that persons
with disabilities should have equal access to post-secondary education, trans-
portation, access to government publications, communication with government,
and training programs. With respect to post-secondary education and transpor-
tation, the Bill requires institutions and municipalities to implement plans for
increased access. The Bill further provides for regulations to deal with subjects
including goals and timetables for improved access. Enforcement of the rights
set out in Bill 168 is to be by complaints to the Human Rights Commission.
(f) The Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, 1994
Bill 167, the Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, 1994 was introduced
in the Ontario Legislature in May of 1994. The Bill was meant to ensure that
"all common-law couples, regardless of their sex, will enjoy equal rights in
Ontario". 290 The Bill amended, directly or indirectly, over 70 statutes, address-
ing inter alia family support obligations, the ability to create contracts for the
sharing of domestic property, wills, employment benefits, adoption of children
by same-sex couples and substitute decision-making. However, despite clear
indications from our higher courts that discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation offends the Charter,29 1 the Bill was defeated on second reading.
290. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), (19 May 1994) at
6453-6454.
291. See for example Haig and Birch v A.G. Canada (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 495 (Ont. C.A.),
and the remarks of the Chief Justice and Justice La Forest in Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral) v. Mossop (1993), 149 N.R. I (S.C.C.).
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E. CONCLUSION
At the close of this year's article, we are reminded of the saying (whether it be
a blessing or a curse) "may you live in interesting times". Clearly 1995 will be
a watershed year for social policy in this country. With so many of the programs
discussed above under review, advocates and the people they assist will have an
opportunity to bring their experiences to bear on the reform process.
In this sense, the coming year holds out the promise of hope; hope that the policy
which evolves from this process will truly serve the needs of the growing
number of low income people in this country. However, the year also holds out
the prospect of fear; fear that it is fiscal and economic policy which will
ultimately be the trump card in the social policy debate.
It is likely that this may be the last article of this type which we write. The
conclusion of the social policy debate could result in an entirely new (and
improved?) unemployment insurance system, different funding and eligibility
criteria for social assistance and universal disability insurance for the province
of Ontario. We may no longer be able write about distinct poverty law programs.
It will require continued dedication and effort on the part of poverty law
advocates, both in the province and nationwide, to ensure that what replaces the
ancien rigime is not the Reign of Terror.
